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Abstract
This study was conducted as part of the World Bank/UNDP “Afghanistan Watching Brief”
Project. The main findings and recommendations of the study are outlined below.
The Mine Action Program for Afghanistan (MAPA) earns substantial net socioeconomic benefits through its mine clearance activities, which fully justify continuing funding of
mine action by the assistance community. The estimated net benefit-cost ratio of MAPA mine
clearance activities, using a 10% discount rate and a 15-year time horizon, is 1.2, which translates
into a high internal rate of return of 28%.
This conclusion is robust to sensitivity analysis. If the human welfare benefits from
reduced mine accidents due to mine clearance are excluded from the calculations, the estimated
benefit-cost ratio declines to 0.8, and the internal rate of return becomes 21%. If the estimated
number of mine accidents is cut by half and welfare benefits remain excluded, the benefit-cost ratio
declines further to 0.6 and the internal rate of return to 19%, still providing a very strong justification
for the mine action program.
MAPA’s costs are held down by the large-scale use of mine-detection dog teams (the
most efficient technique under all conditions where it is feasible), which account for about half of the
total mined area cleared. Use of dogs should be further expanded, which will further increase the net
socio-economic benefits and reduce costs. Mechanical de-mining in Afghanistan has had low, often
negative benefit-cost ratios and should be strictly limited to situations where it is the only feasible
technique, and even then based only on a case-by-case assessment of the socio-economic benefits.
Clearance of irrigation systems and roads earns the highest returns and generally
should be given top priority, along with highly productive agricultural land. The benefits from
clearing grazing land are much more marginal, and hence this activity should generally be assigned
lower priority (although it is fully justified if efficient de-mining techniques are used).
Priority should be given as per MAPA guidelines to clearance of land that will
immediately be put back into productive use once it is free of mines. This could be assured, for
example, through credible community commitment achieved by means of consultations.
It is roughly estimated that clearing the remaining minefields identified by MAPA as
high-priority would cost about $200 million, and that clearing other minefields would cost
another $250-300 million, depending on how many previously undiscovered minefields are found.
Regular, systematic use of cost-benefit analysis should be introduced into the operational
decision-making process for mine clearance. Improved and more systematic data collection is needed
for this purpose. In particular, the information base on mine accident victims needs to be improved
(including through a household survey if one is conducted in Afghanistan).
Greater community participation should be encouraged in the planning and prioritization
of mine action, on the basis of full information on relative costs and benefits of different options.
Differences in unit costs among mine action NGOs need to be looked into. In order to
improve cost-efficiency while maintaining quality and safety standards, competitive bidding for demining contracts among technically qualified de-mining agencies could be introduced gradually
over time, perhaps on a pilot basis initially.
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Executive Summary
The Situation
1.
Afghanistan is among the most mine-affected countries in the world, a legacy of more
than two decades of conflict starting with the occupation by the Soviet Union in the 1980s.
A total area of about 940 sq. km. of mine-contaminated land has been identified and
surveyed as of October 2000, and additional minefields are still being discovered in
previously unsurveyed areas, at a rate of 14-16 sq. km. per year. Laying of mines has
continued sporadically in some parts of the country (mainly re-mining of previously mined
areas). In addition to landmines, there are large amounts of unexploded ordinance (UXO),
concentrated in numerous former battlefields and elsewhere throughout the country.
2.
Two hundred and twenty sq. km. of land have been cleared of mines during more
than a decade of mine action operations, leaving about 720 sq. km. remaining to be cleared,
of which 340 sq. km. has been designated as “high priority” by the Mine Action Program for
Afghanistan (MAPA). The bulk (86%) of this 340 sq. km. consists of agricultural and
grazing land, together with smaller amounts of roads and residential areas and small (but
economically important) areas of irrigation systems and canals.
3.
Landmines have taken a devastating toll of human lives, health, and livelihoods in
Afghanistan. Although the data are deficient, this study estimates that in mid- to late-1990s
there were on average some 500 victims per month from mine and UXO accidents, of which
around 30% were fatalities (although recent data suggest that the incidence of mine accidents
may have fallen in 2000). Another indication of the human toll from mines is the large
number of disabled persons, most of whom among the civilian population are mine/UXO
victims. For example, among amputees who have been registered at the ICRC orthopedic
project in Afghanistan since it began work in 1988, 78% are reported to be victims of mines.
Beyond the loss of economic productivity and individual welfare for the victims and the
inability to productively utilize mine-contaminated land, the human cost of mines to victims’
families, their communities, and to Afghan society as a whole is enormous.
The Mine Action Program
4.
The Mine Action Program for Afghanistan (MAPA) started operations in 1989. It is
a mature program which has gained a great deal of experience during more than a decade.
Consisting of the UN Mine Action Centre for Afghanistan (MACA), four UN Regional Mine
Action Centres (RMACs), and 15 NGO implementing partners, MAPA has a total workforce
of some 4,800 Afghans and less than 10 expatriates.
5.
MAPA is financed primarily from the UNOCHA (the United Nations Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance) Afghanistan Emergency Trust Fund. Some funds
are also passed from donors directly to individual NGOs. Spending on the mine action
program has been substantial – on the order of $20 million per year in recent years.

6.
During its existence, MAPA has cleared a total of 221 sq. km. of minefields,
disposing of 220,000 mines in the process. MAPA is also responsible for clearance of UXO;
more than 300 sq. km. of former battlefields have been cleared and 1.2 million pieces of
UXO removed. The area of minefields cleared by MAPA has gradually increased in recent
years, reaching its highest ever level of 34 sq. km. in 1999. The area of former battlefields
cleared nearly doubled in 1999, reaching a peak of 76 sq. km. MAPA and other agencies
also engage in mine awareness raising activities, which account for about 70% of MAPA’s
total budget.
7.
The average unit cost of de-mining in 1999 according to MAPA was US $0.6 per sq.
m. After various adjustments, this study comes up with an estimate of US $0.77 per sq. m. of
minefields cleared and US $ 0.04 per sq. m. of former battlefields cleared in 1999. These
cost estimates include capital spending, in-kind contributions, the socio-economic costs of
mine accidents to de-miners (which affected 0.5% of the de-mining labor force in 1999), and
administrative overheads (including expatriates’ costs). It is not surprising that clearance of
UXO is much cheaper than mine clearance since UXO is generally much easier to handle.
8.
MAPA has pioneered and experimented with a number of innovative techniques to
enhance the productivity and safety of de-mining activities, including use of back-hoes and
other mechanical devices in urban areas (especially for clearing mines from collapsed
structures) and large-scale deployment of mine-detection dogs (which for the most part are
bred and trained locally). Thus the Afghanistan mine action program includes a rich variety
of different de-mining techniques being used to clear different types of land.
The Study and Its Methodology
9.
Although substantial resources that have been devoted to mine action in Afghanistan
by the assistance community (a total of some $150 million during 1991-1999), a careful
evaluation of the socio-economic benefits and costs of this program was not conducted prior
to this study. This reflects in part past conceptual approaches to mine action: (1) the
“military” approach (i.e. clearing bottlenecks to movements of people and vehicles – echoed
in the more recent emphasis on removing “blockages” to communities) and (2) the
humanitarian approach (saving lives). But mine action is also (3) a development activity,
since it allows those saved from becoming victims of mine accidents to live out economically
productive and personally rewarding lives and also brings mine-contaminated land back into
productive use. Moreover, whether it is considered a humanitarian or development activity,
the mine action program must in any case compete with other worthy humanitarian and
development-oriented programs for limited resources available from the assistance
community. Hence this long overdue study was commissioned as part of the “Afghanistan
Watching Brief” Project funded by the World Bank and jointly supervised by UNDP and the
Bank. The study takes a comprehensive approach to the evaluation of de-mining,
encompassing the “military”, humanitarian, and development perspectives.
10.
The main objective of the study was to estimate, in as comprehensive a manner as
possible with available data, the socio-economic costs of mines (and correspondingly the
benefits of de-mining) and the costs of mine clearance activities. On this basis a socio-
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economic cost-benefit analysis of mine action in Afghanistan would be conducted.
Specifically, the study was expected to assess the overall socio-economic returns reaped by
the resources devoted by the assistance community to mine clearance. It was also intended
that the study would provide some operational guidance to MAPA with respect to (1) the
prioritization of different types of land for mine clearance and (2) the choice of de-mining
techniques. Another objective of the study was to provide a conceptual framework and
methodology, as well as to identify data needs, for regular use of cost-benefit analysis by
MAPA in its operational decision-making. Although not part of its explicit objectives, the
study may also provide useful guidance for socio-economic cost-benefit analysis of mine
action programs in other countries. On the other hand, data limitations and conceptual
difficulties precluded a rigorous analysis of mine awareness activities, although this subject
is touched on in the paper.
11.
The methodology applied is standard cost-benefit analysis, i.e. calculating the ratio
between net benefits (gross benefits minus costs of mine clearance) and costs of mine
clearance. Both costs and benefits are converted into net present value terms, using a
discount rate of 10% per annum and a 15-year time horizon, and internal rates of return also
are calculated. Since de-mining involves clearance of land contaminated by mines, it is most
appropriate to conduct the cost-benefit analysis in terms of units of land area (sq. km. or sq.
m.) cleared of landmines.
12.
Conceptually, the socio-economic costs of landmines can be divided into three broad
categories: (1) loss of life, health, human production potential, and human welfare resulting
from mine accidents; (2) denial of access to mine-infested land and loss of associated
production or consumption benefits from the land concerned; and (3) distortion of behavior
due to the existence of mines with consequent socio-economic losses resulting from longer
travel distances, journeys not undertaken due to greater distance and difficulty, and other
distortions in behavior.
13.
In line with the above categorization of the costs of landmines, the specific socioeconomic benefits of mine clearance that this study focuses on are (1) the gains in economic
productivity due to reduced human losses from mine accidents; (2) the corresponding savings
in medical costs; (3) the improvement in human welfare attributable to reduced human losses
from mine accidents; (4) the net economic benefits attributable to returning reclaimed land to
productive use; and (5) reduced losses of livestock from mine accidents (on those types of
land used by livestock). Land is divided into the following categories: agricultural land,
irrigation systems and canals, roads, grazing lands, and residential areas. For agricultural,
irrigation, and grazing lands, the benefits consist of the estimated net value added of the
production on the land after clearance (including in the case of irrigation the agricultural land
served by irrigation systems cleared of mines), plus the socio-economic benefits of fewer
mine accidents. Reduced loss of livestock from mine accidents is included as a benefit in the
case of agricultural land, roads, and grazing land. Clearance of mines from roads results in
reduced travel times and lower transport costs, which are estimated as the main economic
benefits. For residential land, property values are used as the indicator of the benefits from
mine clearance.
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14.
Turning to the costs of mine clearance, the direct costs (recurrent and capital),
overhead costs, and socio-economic costs of mine accidents during mine clearing operations
together comprise the total cost of de-mining. The cost estimates are derived by calculating
the average cost of de-mining per unit of land area, based on data available from MACA and
its mine action partners. Allocation of these costs between different de-mining techniques
(manual, mechanical, dogs, and community de-mining – of which there is only one example,
a pilot program) is based on partial data from individual de-mining NGOs.
15.
Whereas the data on the costs of de-mining are likely to be reasonably complete and
accurate (at least in aggregate), important but difficult to quantify benefits are left out in the
calculation of the socio-economic benefits of de-mining. These include greater family and
community resilience due to being required to support fewer disabled mine victims, social
stability, and the psychological benefits attributable to being free from worry about mines in
a locality, among other benefits. Moreover, the socio-economic costs of mines (and
corresponding benefits from mine clearance) associated with longer travel distances and
times as a result of the need to avoid minefields (for example in going to collect water or
firewood) are not incorporated in the cost-benefit analysis except in the case of mined roads
(where the main benefit of mine clearance is in the form of reduced travel distances, times,
and costs). While these important benefits that are excluded from the analysis do need to be
kept in mind, the range of benefits included is broad and comprehensively encompasses
elements of the “military”, humanitarian, and development approaches to mine action.
16.
Use of the estimated net value added of production on de-mined land as the indicator
of land-related benefits from mine clearance assumes that the labor inputs for this production
do not have alternative productive uses. In the Afghan context of an extremely weak
economy with widespread unemployment, as well as a large pool of refugees who would
return to Afghanistan if conditions warrant, this assumption is probably not unreasonable. In
fact, making land and associated productive income generation opportunities available to
returning refugees (in areas where there is no conflict) is an important objective of the
assistance community’s overall strategy for support to Afghanistan.
17.
It is implicitly assumed that mines are the only significant factor preventing
productive utilization of the cleared areas, and that no costs beyond those incorporated into
the net value added calculations will need to be incurred to bring the land concerned back
into production. This also may not be an unreasonable assumption in most cases, since
ability to immediately bring land back to productive use is one of the main criteria that
MAPA uses in determining which minefields should be designated as high-priority.
18.
While the methodology used in this study is straightforward, the available data are
deficient. Although some additional data were collected as part of the study, data collection
was not its main focus. Hence estimates and in some cases assumptions were used as
necessary to fill gaps in the data.
19.
The calculation of economic benefits was made manageable by developing stylized
case studies, covering eight different regions of the country (demarcated by provincial
boundaries), based on farming models developed from the Swedish Committee for
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Afghanistan’s agricultural survey and subsequent data from FAO. The eight case studies are
considered to be representative of over 95% of irrigated agricultural land and 85% of rainfed
agricultural land. The regional case studies are used for calculation of the socio-economic
benefits from de-mining of agricultural, irrigation, and grazing land. In the case of irrigation
systems and canals, an adjustment is made to ensure that the benefits are not overstated (due
to double–counting of benefits from clearance of agricultural land and clearance of irrigation
systems associated with that land).
20.
In the case of roads, two stylized case studies were developed, one representing hightraffic areas in or close to urban settings, the other representing the much lower traffic levels
prevalent in rural areas. Two case studies also were developed for residential land, one for
Kabul and Kandahar and other large cities where property values are relatively high, the
other for the rest of the country.
21.
Data on mine accident victims are incomplete, and there are substantial differences
among the various available sources of information. The study attempted to reconcile the
data and came up with its best estimate of the numbers of mine accident victims in 1999
attributable to designated high-priority minefields: 4,000 per year, of which 31% are
estimated to be fatalities. Based on assumptions about differences in accident risks for
different types of mine-contaminated land, estimates were made of the numbers of mine
accident victims per year for the five different categories of land. These figures are subject
to improvement through further data collection and analysis. In particular, reports of lower
numbers of mine accident victims more recently would need to be investigated and assessed.
22.
Evaluating the socio-economic loss due to deaths and serious injuries from mine
accidents raises important conceptual and methodological issues. This study calculates the
net present value of lost economic production and individual welfare of victims of mine
accidents, plus medical costs for victims with serious injuries (blindness, amputation, or
other similar severe injuries). The estimated net present value of the total individual socioeconomic loss for a mine accident fatality is $11,700, which is very conservative even taking
into account Afghanistan’s poverty. For the average mine victim (a composite of 31%
fatality, 46% blindness or amputation, 12% other severe injuries, and 11% light injuries), the
socioeconomic loss is estimated at $9,000.
23.
Based on the estimated number of mine accident victims per sq. km., these figures
can be used to derive estimates of the socio-economic cost of mine accidents per unit area of
minefields. It is assumed that in the absence of mine clearance activity, the rate of accidents
would decline by 5% per year due to survey and delineation of the minefields, explosion and
deterioration of mines, adaptation by the local people, precautionary behaviors, and mine
awareness efforts.
24.
In addition to estimating the ratio of net benefits to costs for each individual case
study, this data can be used to put together an estimate of the overall socio-economic benefits
of MAPA operations. Specifically, the case studies’ estimates of socio-economic benefits
per unit of land area can be multiplied by the amounts of different types of land in different
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regions cleared by MAPA in 1999, using different de-mining techniques, to derive an
estimate of total socioeconomic benefits.
Main Findings
25.
Based on the methodology described above, the study calculated socio-economic
benefit-cost ratios for clearance of the five categories of land (agricultural land, irrigation
systems and canals, roads, grazing land, and residential areas) in eight regions of the country
(where relevant), using three types of de-mining techniques (manual, mechanical, and dog
teams). In addition, the total net benefits and benefit-cost ratio for MAPA activities as a
whole were estimated for 1999.
26.
The study found that MAPA’s mine clearance activities generate substantial socioeconomic benefits (net of costs). The net benefits are estimated at $ 31 million in 1999,
resulting in a very solid net benefit-cost ratio of 1.2. The corresponding internal rate of
return is 28%, well above any normal cut-off points used in the socioeconomic analysis of
public sector or aid-financed investments.
27.
A sensitivity analysis was conducted by excluding the estimated human welfare
losses due to mine accidents. This reduced the estimated net benefits to $ 20 million,
resulting in a benefit-cost ratio of 0.8 and a still very respectable internal rate of return of
21%. If in addition the estimated number of mine accident victims per year is cut in half (i.e.
to 2,000), the benefit-cost ratio declines to 0.6 and the internal rate of return to 19%. Thus
the socio-economic justification for mine action appears to be quite robust to changes in
important estimates/assumptions used in the analysis, especially when it is kept in mind that
there are additional, non-quantifiable benefits from mine clearance for individuals, families,
communities, and societies. Moreover, even if there has been a significant reduction in the
incidence of mine accidents in the last year or so (which some reports suggest), the
sensitivity analysis demonstrates that the socio-economic returns to de-mining would still be
sufficiently high to fully justify the resources devoted to the mine action program.
28.
Concerning the choice of de-mining techniques, clearance by teams using mine
detection dogs is overall the best method, with the highest benefit-cost ratios for all types of
land where use of dogs is feasible. On average dog teams have cleared 3.5 times as much
mined land per team-hour as manual teams during the period 1990-2000 (first half), whereas
the cost per team-hour of dog teams has been somewhat lower than that of manual teams.
This translates into an estimated 4 to 1 cost advantage for dog teams per unit of area cleared.
Mechanical de-mining (back-hoe – the only mechanical de-mining technique used
extensively in Afghanistan) is about 1/3 less costly per team-hour than manual de-mining,
but since less than one-fourth as much land is cleared per team-hour, the cost in terms of land
area is nearly three times as high for mechanical de-mining as it is for manual techniques
(and more than 10 times as high as for dog teams). Moreover, the productivity advantage of
dog teams has been increasing over time and reached 4.8 to one during the period 1998-2000
(first half).
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29.
The very large cost differences cited above translate into much lower socio-economic
benefit-cost ratios for mechanical de-mining (use of back-hoes, the only mechanical
technique utilized to a significant extent in Afghanistan). In the case studies the net benefits
for mechanical de-mining are negative in the case of grazing land, residential areas, much
agricultural land, and some irrigation land. Mechanical de-mining tends to be used on the
more difficult minefields, such as those where there is rubble from collapsed building
structures. Nevertheless, the high costs and low or negative net socio-economic benefits
associated with mechanical de-mining do suggest assigning lower priority to such activities.
The costs of clearance, using mechanical techniques or any other techniques, may be
prohibitively high in such cases.
30.
Turning to the benefit side, clearance of irrigation systems and canals not surprisingly
carries the highest socio-economic returns, followed by roads, agriculture, and then, with
much lower returns, grazing land. Clearance of residential areas also shows high benefit-cost
ratios, but these are based on property values, as opposed to the estimated productive value
of the land which was used in the other case studies. Hence caution should be exercised in
prioritizing mine clearance activities on the basis of the estimated benefit-cost ratios for
residential land. Clearance of grazing land carries the lowest cost-benefit ratios – positive for
dog teams but significantly negative for manual and mechanical de-mining techniques.
Based on the case studies, clearance of irrigation canals and roads is well justified, clearance
of agricultural land and residential areas also is strongly justified if dog teams are used, and
clearance of grazing land is justified only if dog teams or community de-mining is used are
used but not other techniques.
31.
There is considerable variation across regions in the net benefits of mine clearance for
agricultural and irrigation land, since land productivity varies greatly. Although the case
studies are intended to be roughly representative, actual socio-economic returns would vary
according to the specific characteristics of the land being cleared, the density and types of
mines, the cost-efficiency of the de-mining agency, and other factors affecting the difficulty
of mine clearance.
32.
As mentioned earlier, one mine action NGO is conducting community-based demining on a pilot basis. This makes use of communities’ human resources and know-how
and involves participation by trained community members in mine action activities, with
payment in the form of food-for-work or a nominal salary. Only lower-priority minefields,
not containing anti-tank mines or minimum-metal mines, are being cleared by this method.
Although the experience has been limited so far, it appears that this approach may be very
cost-effective.
33.
The study strongly endorses MAPA’s criterion that priority should be given to
clearance of land that will immediately be put back into productive use when it is free of
mines. Significant delays in productive utilization of de-mined land sharply reduce the
discounted present value of the socio-economic benefits and thereby weaken the justification
for mine clearance. Hence targeting land where there is a reasonable guarantee that it will be
immediately put back into productive use (for example based on credible community
commitment achieved through consultations) makes good sense.
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34.
The sensitivity analysis that was conducted does not change the ranking of socioeconomic benefits for different types of land and different techniques. However, more case
studies show negative benefit-cost ratios for certain techniques. Whereas these ratios remain
significantly positive for mine dog teams in clearance of all types of land except grazing
areas, mechanical de-mining carries negative net socio-economic benefits in most cases, and
manual techniques become marginal or negative except for irrigation canals and roads.
35.
Based on the unit cost data calculated in this study, it is possible to roughly estimate
the cost of clearing the remaining identified and surveyed minefields in Afghanistan. The
average estimated unit cost of $0.77 per sq. m. should be reduced somewhat, however, to
take into account efficiency improvements that would result from scaling up and further
increasing the use of mine-detection dogs. Hence a figure of $0.60 (20% lower) is used. On
this basis, it is roughly estimated that clearing the remaining minefields identified by MAPA
as high-priority would cost about $200 million, and that clearing other minefields would cost
another $250-300 million, depending on how many previously undiscovered minefields are
found. In a situation where there is an end to conflict and large numbers of refugees and
displaced persons return to their homes, land use and movements of people will increase
(with associated higher risks of mine accidents), so it will make sense to expand the demining program and make faster progress toward eliminating the problem of landmines for
the bulk of the Afghan people.
36.
Although this study did not conduct a detailed cost-benefit analysis of UXO
clearance, the cost per unit area of land cleared is much lower than in the case of de-mining.
This strongly suggests that the sharp increase in UXO clearance activities in recent years is
well-justified. Better data on accident victims, which clearly distinguish between mine and
UXO accidents, would be helpful in assessing the socio-economic justification for UXO
clearance and its appropriate priority vis-à-vis mine clearance.
Implications and Recommendations
37.
This study’s findings confirm that mine clearance activities in Afghanistan generate
substantial overall net socio-economic benefits, even when conservatively estimated, and
therefore that continuing funding of mine action by the assistance community is welljustified. The Afghanistan mine action program is also found to be relatively cost-effective,
due mainly to the large-scale use of dog teams for mine detection. However, the study also
suggests that there is scope for further improvements and makes a number of
recommendations in this regard.
38.
Regular, systematic use of socio-economic cost-benefit analysis should be introduced
in the operational decision-making of the mine action program. This will promote better
prioritization of activities and use of the most appropriate de-mining techniques, further
increasing the net socio-economic benefits of mine action and improving cost-effectiveness.
Of course, cost-benefit analysis should not be applied in a rigid or mechanical manner but
needs to be used flexibly in line with local conditions. Building on the generic stylized case
studies put forward in this study, general guidelines can be developed for prioritizing de-
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mining activities. Simplified templates for cost-benefit analysis also could be prepared,
which could be used ex ante to guide operational decision-making and ex post for evaluation.
39.
Expanded and more systematic use of cost-benefit analysis requires better data.
Information on the numbers of victims of mine accidents is incomplete and should be
improved through better data collection and coordination among the agencies responsible.
Data on mine accident victims gathered as part of a broader household survey would be very
useful in assessing the longer-term impact of mines on Afghan society as a whole. On the
benefit side, alternative methods for calculating the benefits of clearing commercial and
residential land can be developed.
40.
Greater community participation in the planning and prioritization of mine clearance
activities is highly desirable and would complement regular use of cost-benefit analysis. For
example, community consultations could form the basis for determining whether there is a
reasonable assurance that land cleared of mines will immediately be put back into productive
use, which as noted above is critical for achieving high socio-economic returns in practice.
Community participation in some aspects of mine action, where feasible and appropriate,
also should be explored further, based on the apparently successful experience with a small
pilot program.
41.
Among different types of land, clearance of irrigation systems and roads should
generally receive top priority since they generate the highest net socio-economic benefits,
while clearance of productive agricultural land also is highly beneficial and should be given
priority.
The measurable socio-economic benefits from clearing grazing land are
considerably lower and are estimated to be positive only in the case of de-mining with dog
teams or community-based de-mining. Clearance of residential land appears to carry high
socio-economic benefits, but further work is needed to place these estimates on a more
comparable basis with those for other types of land.
42.
Since dog teams constitute the most efficient technique for de-mining under all
conditions where use of dogs is feasible, their use should be expanded further (at present they
account for just under half of the total area being cleared of mines on an annual basis). This
would be mainly at the expense of manual de-mining. Mechanical de-mining (back-hoe
technique) appears to earn marginal or negative net socio-economic benefits in most cases, so
it should be strictly limited to situations where it is the only feasible technique (e.g. collapsed
structures with multiple layers of mines). Even then, the returns should be assessed on a
case-by-case basis before proceeding, as the costs in many cases would not justify
mechanical de-mining. Experimentation with new mechanical techniques should continue in
the interest of exploring possibilities for developing more efficient mechanical approaches to
de-mining.
43.
The recommended shift in the mix of de-mining techniques in favor of dog teams
would reduce the labor-intensity of the mine action program (i.e. the amount of labor
required per unit of land area or per mine cleared). However, since the cost of dogs is
relatively low and de-miners are still needed to physically extract the mines, the cost
structure of mine dog teams remains skewed in favor of wage costs as opposed to the cost of
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dogs and other costs. Thus the main effect of use of dog teams is sharply increased labor
productivity with a modest shift in cost structure. In the short run, increased use of mine dog
teams could be leveraged into a substantial increase in the volume and pace of de-mining
work. Over the longer term, resources could be redeployed to other parts of the assistance
program.
44.
There appear to be significant differences in efficiency and costs among de-mining
agencies. Although the study could not go into this aspect in detail, there may be scope for
improvements in the operational efficiency of mine clearance activities. It is recommended
that possible cost differences among different de-mining agencies be analyzed more
thoroughly. Such a review should also examine staffing and labor productivity levels in the
different mine action NGOs. Depending on the outcome of such a review, it may be
necessary to explore measures to improve cost-efficiency. A promising option in this regard
would be competitive bidding for de-mining contracts among technically-qualified de-mining
agencies, based on explicit technical and safety qualification requirements. Such a change
would need to be well-prepared, and could be started initially on a pilot basis before being
gradually expanded. Competition in this manner would provide stronger incentives for the
high-cost mine action NGOs to improve efficiency and contain costs.
45.
In conclusion, a number of areas for further work have been identified. The
information base on mine accident victims needs to be improved (including through a
household survey if one is conducted in Afghanistan). More systematic work on mine
awareness activities and their impact would be helpful in assessing this component of the
mine action program. A socio-economic evaluation of UXO clearance (which would require
better data on numbers of UXO accidents and victims) would provide a better basis for
prioritizing MAPA’s activities as between mine and UXO clearance. And simplified
methodologies, guidelines, and templates should be developed for regular, systematic use of
cost-benefit analysis in MAPA’s operational decisionmaking.
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1.

Introduction

This study of the socio-economic impact of mine action in Afghanistan is part of the
World Bank-funded “Afghanistan Watching Brief” program, jointly implemented by UNDP
and the World Bank. This program has supported three main types of activity: (1) economic
and sector studies on topics of importance for the Afghan economy and for international
assistance to Afghanistan (including trade, agriculture, and remittances in addition to mine
action); (2) conferences, workshops, and inter-agency teamwork on topics of interest to the
assistance community (for example, education, health, and food security); and (3) short-term
training for Afghan women NGOs based in Peshawar, Pakistan to improve their job-related
skills.
In view of the substantial resources that have been devoted to mine action in
Afghanistan by the international assistance community (totaling some $150 million during
1991-1999), a careful evaluation of the socio-economic benefits and costs of this program
was overdue. Hence this study was commissioned, with broad terms of reference, in early
2000.
The main objective of the study was to estimate the socio-economic costs of mines
(and correspondingly the benefits of de-mining) and the costs of mine clearance activities.
On this basis a cost-benefit analysis of mine action in Afghanistan would be conducted.
More specifically, the study was expected to assess the overall socio-economic returns
reaped by the resources devoted to mine clearance. It was also intended that the study would
analyze and provide some operational guidance to the Mine Action Program for Afghanistan
(MAPA) with respect to (1) the prioritization of different types of land for mine clearance
and (2) the choice of de-mining techniques. Another objective of the study was to provide a
conceptual framework and methodology, as well as to identify data needs, for regular use of
cost-benefit analysis by MAPA. The study was expected to include some discussion of
issues related to mine awareness activities, community participation in mine action
prioritization and decisionmaking, and unexploded ordnance (UXO), but it was not expected
to analyze these topics in detail.
A Steering Committee consisting of representatives from the World Bank, UNDP,
and MAPA was appointed to guide and support the work for this study. The work involved
extensive data gathering, processing, and analysis, relying heavily on the database of the
Mine Action Center for Afghanistan (MACA). There were field visits to Afghanistan in June
and October 2000. In addition, there were several interactions in Pakistan, including
meetings with the Steering Committee and a preliminary donor briefing on the scope and
methodology of the study in September 2000.
Despite serious deficiencies in the available data, discussed in detail later in this
paper, the study was able to achieve its main objectives. An initial draft report was prepared
in December 2000, and it was subsequently revised in February 2001 and then in April 2001.
The report was presented at the international conference on “Analytical Foundations for
Assistance to Afghanistan: Perspectives from the Afghanistan Watching Brief Project” which
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was held in Islamabad, Pakistan on June 5-6, 2001. Substantial revisions in the report were
made subsequently in the light of comments received at the conference and further work in
certain areas.
After some brief background discussion on Afghanistan’s economy in Section 2, a
summary of the history of mines in Afghanistan in Section 3, and an introduction to the mine
action program in Section 4, the substantive analysis in this paper is organized as follows:
Section 5 assesses the human cost of mine accidents. For the purposes of the socioeconomic cost-benefit analysis, this involves estimating the accident risk represented by
active minefields, quantified as the expected numbers and types of mine accident victims per
unit area of high-priority mine-contaminated land. It is also necessary to derive an estimate
of the cost of loss of life and serious injuries due to mine accidents, including loss of human
production capabilities, reduced human welfare, and medical costs.
Section 6, using eight stylized case studies for different regions of the country,
evaluates the economic loss associated with mine-contaminated agricultural land and
correspondingly the economic benefits of clearing mines from agricultural land.
Section 7 conducts a similar analysis of irrigation systems infested by mines.
Section 8 analyzes the economic costs of mine-infested grazing areas and of mine
accidents to livestock, and the corresponding benefits from clearing grazing land.
Section 9 looks at the problems created for transport and travel in Afghanistan by
mine-infested roads and the economic benefits from reopening road links that have been
blocked by mines for traffic.
Section 10 discusses mines in residential areas and estimates the economic benefits of
mine clearance for residential areas.
Section 11 addresses the cost side of the equation – the total costs of MAPA mine
action operations, the cost per de-mining team-hour of work, the productivity of teams (in
terms of area of mine cleared per hour), and ultimately MAPA’s cost per unit of land area
cleared. The unit costs are calculated for different de-mining techniques.
Pulling together and building on the earlier analysis, Section 12 presents and
discusses the results of the socioeconomic cost-benefit analysis of mine clearance.
Section 13 briefly discusses two topics which the study was not able to cover in
depth: clearance of UXO from former battlefields and mine awareness-raising activities.
Section 14 looks briefly at the community dimension and how it relates to socioeconomic analysis of mine clearance.
Section 15 recapitulates the main findings and recommendations of the study.
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2.

Brief Overview of Afghanistan’s Economy

There has never been an accurate Census or other precise data on Afghanistan’s
population. In 1979 the total population of Afghanistan was estimated at 14 million, whereas
at present the population in-country (not including refugees in Pakistan and Iran) is estimated
at 18-20 million. Before the war about 85% of the people lived in rural areas, including 1.5
million nomads. About 70% of the total labor force was engaged in agriculture, livestock,
and livestock-based handicrafts. Even before the war Afghanistan was one of the world’s
least developed countries. The past 20 years of conflict have exacerbated poverty,
deprivation, and suffering.
Afghanistan’s pre-war economy was mainly based on agriculture and animal
husbandry. The country has a low population density due to difficult topographical and
climatic conditions (high mountains covering most of the country, extremes of temperatures,
and arid to semi-arid climate). In 1978 – the last year of peace – Afghanistan was largely
self-sufficient in food and was a significant exporter of agricultural products. Agriculture
was largely concentrated in narrow river valleys and plains where irrigation water from
snowmelt was available. Manufacturing industry was largely undeveloped, with only a few
plants established (in textiles, medicines, cement, etc.). Afghanistan’s strategic position
during the Cold War period made it a large recipient of foreign aid, which funded the running
of a centralized but relatively weak state without substantial domestic taxation. Also largely
as a result of foreign aid, the country had a relatively good major road network, as well as
some other infrastructure including major irrigation and hydroelectric facilities. This modern
infrastructure, however, did not extend beyond the main arteries and urban centers. Social
and other services (such as education and health) were largely limited to the relatively small
urban sector.
The long drawn-out war of Soviet occupation and subsequent internecine conflict
severely damaged Afghanistan’s economy. By the mid-1990s, most of the country’s limited
modern infrastructure was destroyed, and traditional irrigation systems greatly suffered from
destruction and lack of maintenance. Even more important than the physical damage was the
increasing breakdown of the state over time and the progressive erosion of institutions – both
modern and traditional – which had governed the pre-war economy. Government-provided
social services, which had never had a strong outreach into the rural areas, atrophied and to a
large extent stopped functioning. Inflation wiped out the value of the Afghan currency in the
1990s. Agricultural output came down sharply, livestock herds were depleted, and largescale industries almost ceased functioning. Millions of Afghans became refugees in
neighboring Pakistan and Iran, and to a lesser extent elsewhere. This diaspora played an
important role, however, in supporting Afghanistan’s economy through remittances. And
finally, as discussed in the following section, land and infrastructure were widely and
indiscriminately sown with landmines, causing enormous human and economic losses.
There was a modest economic recovery in the mid-1990s in areas that became largely
free of conflict. Agricultural production increased; livestock herds sharply rose in numbers,
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taking advantage of widely available unutilized grazing lands; and horticultural production
also grew based on restoration and expansion of orchards and vineyards. Substantial
numbers of refugees returned to their home with international assistance. The economic
recovery was concentrated in areas of the country taken over relatively early by the Taliban
(who now control about 90% of the country); they removed barriers to trade and restored a
certain degree of order. However, the deterioration in social services (particularly education)
was aggravated by the Taliban’s social policies, which largely excluded women from work
and girls from school.
The introduction of a certain degree of stability in large parts of the country also
facilitated the growth of various kinds of unofficial economic activities, most notably longdistance trade (particularly re-exports to Pakistan) and opium poppy cultivation. Although
these activities had always been present, they underwent unprecedented expansion in the
1990s. Unofficial exports to Pakistan are roughly estimated to have exceeded $2 billion in
1996, and by the late 1990s Afghanistan had become the largest producer of opium poppy in
the world. Also falling in this category of economic activities is uncontrolled exploitation of
natural resources – timber, gems, marble and granite, etc. – which have resulted in extensive
deforestation and environmental degradation, among other problems.
Most recently, Afghanistan has been hit by a severe, protracted drought, which started
in 1999 and has lasted until the present. Crop production has been halved and livestock
herds heavily depleted. Large and increasing numbers of people have lost their means of
livelihood and have become displaced, either internally or to neighboring countries.
Malnutrition has significantly worsened, and starvation deaths have been reported. The
impact of the drought, which would have been serious under any circumstances, has been
aggravated by the continuing conflict in parts of the country (particularly in northeastern and
central Afghanistan), and by the run-down condition of irrigation systems and other
agricultural infrastructure.
In sum, Afghanistan’s economic structure has been gravely weakened, distorted, and
made more vulnerable through two decades of conflict. Agriculture (including livestock), the
most important licit economic activity, is highly vulnerable to natural conditions as is
demonstrated by the current drought. Trade activities are vulnerable to the policies of
neighboring countries, most notably Pakistan – in fact, there appears to have been a
substantial decline in Afghanistan’s unofficial re-exports to Pakistan in the recent past,
probably reflecting changing policies and enforcement behavior in Pakistan. Remittances,
another major source of income, are probably more stable, but nevertheless they are
vulnerable to changes in economic conditions in the source countries. The Taliban’s recent
complete ban on opium poppy cultivation, which is a very positive move and has been
largely effective, has sharply reduced the incomes of those small farmers and rural wage
laborers who were dependent on poppy cultivation and related work. Foreign aid, another
important albeit smaller source of income, has increased sharply in the wake of the drought
but also is subject to fluctuations.
Afghanistan’s economic situation has significant regional spill-over effects – through
unofficial trade, narcotics and other illegal activities, financial flows, and movement of
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people. These spill-over effects tend to undermine revenue collection, governance, and the
effectiveness of economic policies in neighboring countries, particularly Pakistan. The long
drawn-out conflict situation, without an effectively functioning state much of the time, has
led to a situation where conflict-related or conflict-enabled economic activities and structures
have become entrenched, and there are significant groups who are benefiting from the current
situation and therefore have a vested interest in its continuation.
Although all of these problems are daunting, and peace is obviously a prerequisite for
the strong recovery and sustained rapid economic development that Afghanistan desperately
needs, there is nevertheless potential for economic improvement in normal (i.e. non-drought)
climatic conditions. Freeing people and land from the scourge of landmines is a precondition
for economic progress under either a peace or a conflict scenario.
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3.

The History of Mines in Afghanistan

Afghanistan is among the most mine-affected countries in the world. During the
Soviet occupation of 1980-1989 and the subsequent war between Afghan government troops
and the resistance forces, landmines were used indiscriminately. Mines were used for
conventional military purposes, and also as part of the Soviet strategy to depopulate villages
in order to eliminate local support for the resistance. Mines were therefore placed in houses,
irrigation systems, agricultural land, and grazing areas, as well as being used for conventional
military purposes on roads and around military establishments. Guerrilla forces used mines
to block roads and to harass opponents. Modern delivery systems enabled mines to be
scattered by helicopters and other aircraft. In addition there are huge amounts of unexploded
ordnance (UXO) on former battlefields and scattered throughout the country.
As can be seen from Figure 3.1, the bulk of mine contamination took place in the
1980s, with a peak of mine-laying in the mid-1980s. However, some new deployment
occurred in the mid-1990s. In recent years deployment of new mines has not been
significant.
Figure 3.1: Minefields in km2 by Year of Mining
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Landmines and UXO are scattered throughout the country – in urban and commercial
areas, towns, and villages, as well as on farmland. Mine and UXO contamination affects 28
of the 29 provinces, with heavier concentrations and greater impact in the eastern region,
including Kabul, and in the southern and western regions.
By the end of October 2000, the remaining area contaminated by landmines
throughout Afghanistan was estimated at 718 km2 (see Table 3.1). Of this, 339 km2 are
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assessed as high priority – vitally important residential areas, commercial land, roads,
irrigation systems, and productive land.
Table 3.1: Mine Contamination in Afghanistan, Situation at end-year 2000
Total mine contaminated area identified to date
– of which high priority area
Area cleared to date – all high priority
Remaining area to be cleared
Remaining high priority area to be cleared
– Agricultural areas
– Residential and commercial land
– Irrigation systems and canals
– Roads
– Grazing areas
Source: MAPA MIS Survey Database

Area km2
938
560
220
718
339
153
14
3
32
137

National data on the rate of mine and UXO casualties are not available, but the
limited data that have been collected show a grim picture. Non-combatant casualties may
have been as high as 150 to 300 a month in the mid- to late-1990s, but more are believed to
die before receiving medical treatment.
It is estimated that access to 87,500 houses has been blocked by landmines1,
constituting one of the major obstacles to the return of refugees and internally displaced
persons to their villages.
Current assessments indicate that if the remaining 339 km2 of high-priority mined
area can be cleared, most Afghans could resume a normal, productive life. This will take
some 7-10 years if current funding levels for mine clearing are maintained. The extent of new
mining throughout the country was investigated in 1998 and again in late 1999 by MAPA.
While a concern, the amount of new mine-laying does not appear to be substantial. Old
minefields are still being discovered, at a rate of 14-16 km2 a year. These areas were mined
years ago but are discovered by MAPA when different parts of the country become
accessible.
Table 3.2: New Minefields Found, in km2
Year
km2

2000-Oct.
1999
1998
1997
1996
12.5
16.4
14.0
15.6
13.6
Includes both high and low priority mined areas.

During the years of war from 1978 onward, up to one-third of the population fled the
country or was internally displaced. Many farming areas were depopulated. In 1993 the UN
launched an emergency relief and rehabilitation program for Afghanistan, to enable and
encourage people to return to their homes. A key element of this program was to bring
agricultural land back into production, in order to provide food and employment for the
returnees. This required significant efforts in removing mines and UXO from access roads
and agricultural land, and restoring abandoned irrigation systems.
1

Source: SEIS page 16.
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In many countries it has been observed that the number of dead and injured from
mine accidents tends to peak as refugees and displaced persons return to their homes. It then
descends rapidly over the following months and years, even in quite severely affected
countries. The peak years for mine incidents in Afghanistan appear to have corresponded
with periods of large-scale repatriation. One peak year could have been 1988, when the
Soviet army began its withdrawal. There was an upsurge of resistance activity and some
Afghans repatriated voluntarily. No survey or clearance had taken place by that time and
minefields were active and unmarked. In 1990, the year after the final withdrawal of Russian
troops, there was also some repatriation into the country. During the period 1992-1994 some
2.5 million Afghans returned home. Following this spontaneous repatriation, there appears to
have been a considerable increase in the number of mine victims. The deficient data on
victims cannot provide any confirmation of this, however.
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4.

The Mine Action Program for Afghanistan

The Mine Action Program for Afghanistan (MAPA) started operations in 1989. Since
then it has expanded from a few hundred de-miners assisted by a dozen foreign experts to a
workforce of some 4,800 Afghans and fewer than 10 expatriates.
MAPA consists of the UN Mine Action Centre for Afghanistan (MACA), four UN
Regional Mine Action Centres (RMAC), and 15 implementing partners (NGOs). In the
absence of an indigenous national co-ordinating body, MACA plans, manages, and oversees
all mine action activities for Afghanistan as well as providing technical support and ensuring
proper integration of mine action into the humanitarian assistance program of the country.
The 15 NGOs implement most physical activities associated with mine action, including
awareness raising, technical training, survey, and clearance.
•
•
•
•
•

MAPA’s field of activities comprises:
Surveying and clearing of minefields and former battlefields.
Mine and UXO awareness and education.
Technical training and program development/management.
Advocacy: The Afghan Campaign to Ban Landmines.
Landmine survivors rehabilitation and reintegration.

MAPA has pioneered the development of a number of innovative techniques to
enhance the productivity of de-mining teams, including the use of back-hoes in urban areas
and the large-scale deployment of mine-detection dogs. During its 10 years of activity, the
program has cleared 220 km2 of minefields and over 300 km2 of contaminated former
battlefields, removing over 220,000 mines and 1.2 million pieces of unexploded ordnance
(UXO) in the process (see Figure 4.1 and Table 4.1 below).
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Figure 4.1: Clearance km2 by Year

Table 4.1: Clearance of Minefields and Former Battlefields, 1990-2000, km2
Year
Minefields
Battlefields

1990-2000
220.6
303.7

1999
34.2
75.7

1998
33.5
39.1

1997
32.6
49.2

1996
21.6
34.1

9

1995
23.9
19.5

1994
20.7
22.7

1993
9.9

1992
7.4

1991
10.2

1990
6.4

Despite political divisions and conflict within the country, MAPA has been able to
operate successfully in all areas. The program continues to receive strong support and
recognition from the warring factions in Afghanistan and the Afghan population in general,
as well as from the international community.
The major part of the mine action NGOs’ funding is channelled through the
UNOCHA Afghanistan Emergency Trust Fund (AETF), which is administered by UN
Organization for Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (UNOCHA) in Geneva. Table
4.2 shows trends in MAPA funding through AETF for the period from 1991 to 1999, and
also MAPA’s reported cost of clearing in US$ per m2. Unit costs have come down
significantly over the last decade. The figure US$ 0.6 per m2 is frequently used in MAPA’s
reports as the unit cost of mine clearance.1 However, some other factors need to be taken
into account to give a more complete picture:
AETF is not the only source of funding. Some NGOs receive support, financial and
in kind, directly from donors. Information about this support has not been collected for the
MAPA annual reports of previous years, whereas all areas cleared of mines are reported as
MAPA activity.
MAPA activities also include clearance of UXO from former battlefields, over 300
km2 in the period 1990-2000 as compared to about 220 km2 of minefields. The time (in
team-hours) it takes to clear a former battlefield is less than 1/30 of the time required to clear
a minefield of equal size. Nevertheless, clearance of former battlefields is not a negligible
part of the activity and influences the cost of the program.
MAPA is also engaged in other activities covered by the same budget, most notably
mine awareness. Some of the NGOs supported by MAPA are engaged in mine awareness
exclusively, while others are active in both mine clearing and mine awareness. Mine
awareness constitutes US$ 1.8 million out of the total of US$ 26.3 million requested by
MAPA as funding for the year 2000, i.e. about 7% of the total.
Table 4.2: AETF Funding for MAPA in Million US$ and
Cost per m2 of Minefields Cleared During 1991-1999
Year
US$ mill.
US$/m2 minefield

1999
22.1
0.6

1998
22.2
0.7

1997
20.2
0.6

1996
17.7
0.8

1995
15.6
0.7

1994
16.9
0.8

1993
17.4
1.8

1992
11.1
1.5

1991
7.9
0.8

After survey (level 2), minefields and former battlefields are assigned priority as to
which ones should be cleared first. Taking the decision on this is normally the responsibility
of MAPA’s four Regional Mine Action Centers (RMAC). Prioritization is in accordance
with the following guidelines:
1st Priority:
2nd Priority:
1

Agricultural land, roads, housing/residential areas, and irrigation
systems, expected to be reclaimed immediately by users.
Same types of land, expected to be put in use after six months.

See for example MAPA: Annual Workplan for Year 2000, page 32.
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3rd Priority:
4th Priority:
5th Priority:

Same types of land, expected to be put in use after 2-3 years.
Grazing areas, and also some agricultural land or roads.
Grazing areas only.

The areas declared to be of high priority in Table 3.1 will correspond to 1st Priority
here. Some grazing areas have also been considered high priority.
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5.
5.1

Estimating the Human Loss from Mines

Mine Victims in Afghanistan

The devastating toll on human lives and health is unquestionably the most cruel
impact of mines and UXO. Quantitative information on the human loss is to a large degree
deficient, as the available data on mine victims in Afghanistan suffer from lack of reliability
and completeness. Moreover, data collection efforts by different agencies are not wellcoordinated.
Various studies have been conducted , and data continue to be collected regularly by
various agencies like ICRC, MAPA, Save the Children, and local NGOs. The degree to
which the data are representative and provide reliable information about the situation in the
entire country is questionable, however. No available data source constitutes anything close
to a complete count, and there is evidence that many mine accidents involving dead and
wounded victims are not reported anywhere. Data collection efforts are not based on a wellconceived sampling technique, and double-counting may occur in the data reported by
different agencies.
It is not surprising, therefore, that different sources give widely varying figures for
the number of mine victims in Afghanistan:
• The MAPA Annual Workplan for 2000 states that the number of mine accident casualties
may be as high as 150 to 300 a month, but it adds that many more are believed to die
before receiving medical treatment.1
• The SEIS (Socio-Economic Impact Study of Landmines and Mine Action Operations in
Afghanistan) study’s estimate for a recent year (1997) is 10-12 a day or 300-360 a month,
representing a decline from 20-24 people a day or 600-720 a month in 1993.
• ICRC (Red Cross) in Kabul’s assessment is 300 to 500 a month based on mine casualties
arriving at their hospitals.
• The AMVIS (Afghanistan Mine Victims Information System) initiative estimates the
total accumulated number of victims (dead and survivors) to be around 60,000 by year
2000.
• SEIS presents estimates for the total number of landmine victims amounting to 90,000104,000 as of the end of 1997.
The SEIS study, based on data from 5,140 mine accident victims, provides some
information on the age and gender composition of victims and the types of injuries suffered.
From the SEIS study, it appears that the vast majority (96%) of civilian mine and UXO
casualties are male. Afghan men may be more exposed to mines than women in their daily
activities. It might also be the case that female casualties are significantly underreported, and
that women are less likely than men to present themselves for treatment at hospitals. The
death rate among the reported casualties is about 30%, and a further 40% have to undergo
1

MAPA: Annual Workplan for Year 2000, page 16.
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amputation. The serious categories of injuries make up altogether about 90% of the registered
casualties. It is likely that light injuries are seldom reported. The SEIS study also observes
that a considerable share (about 40%) of the victims were educated, at least having
completed primary education. Moreover, about half of the victims were responsible for
supporting their families.
Figure 5.1: Mine/UXO Injuries as Percentage
of Injured Persons in Reported Accidents
Under 18 years: 34%

18 to 40 years: 53%

Over 40: 13%

Age groups
Female: 4%

M ale: 96%
M ale/fem ale
Death: 31%

Blind: 6%

10%

30%

Amputation: 40%

Severe injury: 12%

Light: 11%

Casualties

0%

20%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Source: MCPA, Socio-Economic Impact Survey 1999 (SEIS)

The ICRC Orthopedic Project in Afghanistan has five centers, located in Kabul,
Mazar-e-Sharif, Herat, Jalalabad and Gulbahar. Since this project started in 1988, over
36,000 patients have been registered. Due to large demand and the almost complete absence
of alternative facilities, in 1995 the project extended assistance to non-amputees and non-war
wounded patients as well. Of the total number of amputees at the ICRC centres, 78% are
registered as victims of mines, 70% are civilians, 82% adult males, 8% boys less than 14
years of age, 7% women, and 3% girls under 14. The ICRC data thus also indicate that there
is a rather small proportion of females among the mine victims.
For the purposes of the socio-economic analysis in this study, the total number of
civilian mine accident victims is estimated by combining the ICRC and SEIS data. The
following adjustments are made:
• The patients registered with ICRC also include non-civilians and non-mine victims. The
ICRC data have been corrected to exclude these patients, based on the detailed
breakdown available from ICRC.
• ICRC’s data on registered patients include mainly amputees and only a relatively small
proportion of non-amputees. In the SEIS survey, amputees constitute 40% of all reported
mine accident victims on average, and other severe injuries 12%. It is therefore assumed
that the ICRC patients comprise all amputees and half of the severely injured from mine
accidents.
With these adjustments, the total number of civilian mine accident victims has been
estimated for the period from 1995 to 1999, as shown in Table 5.1. The total number of
victims is estimated to have remained at about 500 per month during most of the years in this
period, including in the first four months of 2000 based on ICRC patient registrations. The
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estimated number of mine accident victims in 1995 was lower than in the other years and in
1999 somewhat higher.
Table 5.1: Estimated Mine Accident Victims 1995-2000
2000-April
1999 1998 1997 1996 1995
Civilian mine victims
2062
7553 6089 5872 5989 3661
Mine victims/month
515
629
507
489
499
305
- Deaths/month
155
189
152
147
150
92
Source: Calculated figures based on adjusted ICRC and SEIS information

In the Report of the National Survey of Mines Situation from 1993,2 a total of 339
districts in all 29 provinces of Afghanistan were surveyed. Mine problems were reported in
162 of these districts. Surveys could not be carried out in 17 districts due to security
problems, and 177 districts were reported free of mines. In the surveyed communities, it was
found that over 20,000 people had been killed and about 16,000 disabled through mine
accidents. With this background, the survey report estimated that 20-25 mine incidents
involving the civilian population occurred in Afghanistan every day, or about 8000 every
year. The percentage of deaths in this survey was 55%, a higher proportion than the 31%
recorded in the SEIS study from 1999.
A regression analysis of the data from the 1993 National Survey clearly indicates that
the number of mine victims is positively related to the area of high-priority minefields and
the population (number of families) in a locality. The area of low-priority minefields seems
to be of little significance, as would be expected. A problem with the 1993 survey from an
analytical point of view is the lack of information about the time period when accidents took
place. On the other hand, the SEIS data does not have any information on where mine
accidents occurred.
For further analysis it is most convenient to apply an Accident Risk concept, defined
as the danger represented by an active minefield expressed in terms of the expected number
of casualties per year and per km2 of mined area. Given the deficient statistics on mine
victims in Afghanistan, however, such calculations require a number of assumptions. Not
only does the number of mine accident victims need to be estimated, but the size of the
mined area on which these accidents occur is uncertain. New mined areas continue to be
identified, including some high-priority minefields. While the total area of high-priority
minefields identified as of the beginning of 2000 amounted to 530 km2, the real area could be
as much as 600 km2. Out of this area, 200 km2 have been cleared, leaving 400 km2 as a
reasonable estimate of the total uncleared high-priority mined area in Afghanistan in 2000.3
The corresponding number of mine victims can be estimated at 4,000 per year, as
shown in Table 5.2. This figure is not meant to comprise the total civilian mine and UXO
victims in Afghanistan, which may be in the range of 6,000 per year. Instead, it covers only
2

MCPA 1993: Report of the National Survey of Mines Situation.
This estimate is somewhat higher than the total area of identified high-priority minefields that have not yet
been cleared. If it overstates the actual area of uncleared high-priority minefields in existence, the number of
casualties per unit area would be underestimated, imparting a downward bias to the human cost of mines and
correspondingly to the socio-economic benefits from mine clearance.
3
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the victims of mine accidents taking place on the 400 km2 of uncleared high-priority
minefields. Victims of mine accidents taking place on low-priority areas and victims of
UXO accidents, whose total number undoubtedly is substantial, are not included. The
estimate of 4,000 mine victims per year represents the number of casualties that could be
avoided if the 400 km2 of high-priority minefields are cleared. This estimate yields an
Accident Risk of 10 victims annually per km2 of high-priority mined area in Afghanistan.
Table 5.2: Calculation of Estimated Accident Risk
Year
Identified high-priority mined area km2.
Estimated actual high-priority mined area km2.
Cleared minefields km2.
Estimated active high-priority minefields km2.
Estimated number of victims/year
Victims per day
Victims/km2 mined area/year

2000
530
600
200
400
4000
11
10

Different types of mined areas generate different accident risks, and those close to
populated areas will normally be the most exposed. It is normally the case that mined
residential/commercial areas, irrigation canals, and roads carry the highest risk, while
agricultural areas carry somewhat less and grazing areas the least risk of mine accidents.
Specific data on mine accident risks for different types of land is not available, however.
Hence based on available qualitative information and impressions, it will be assumed that the
risk of mine accidents is twice as great on mine-contaminated agricultural land as on grazing
land, and three times as great on residential land as on grazing land.
These assumptions, along with the earlier estimates, provide the basis for the risk
calculations presented in Table 5.3 on the number of victims annually per km2 of different
types of mined land. The accident risks for each type of land are calibrated such that when
multiplied by the estimated areas of different types of high-priority minefields, the total
number of victims on the 400 km2 of high-priority minefields is 4,000, for an average of 10
victims per km2 per year.
Table 5.3: Risk of mine accidents – Estimated Number of Victims
Annually per km2 on Different Types of Mined Area
Victims/km2
17
17
17
11
6
10

Type of area
Residential/commercial
Roads
Irrigation systems
Agricultural land
Grazing areas
Average/total
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5.2

Valuation of Lost Human Welfare and Production Capacity

The accepted methods for valuation of the human loss from accidents are based on
the resources needed to correct the effects of the accident, i.e. what it would cost society to
restore the victim or his/her relatives and friends to the situation in which they found
themselves before the accident.
The Human Capital Approach measures the loss to society when one of its members
dies or becomes disabled, based on the value of working time or value of production the
individual is responsible for. According to this method, the cost of death or disablement is
calculated on basis of the lost future productive potential of the victim. Production for future
years is discounted to the present date using a stipulated discount rate, which has been set at
10% per year in this study. Production may be calculated in gross or net terms. In the latter
case expenditure on consumption is deducted, leaving the production loss to society
excluding the victim.
The Value of Lost Lifetime Years method attempts to incorporate the value of the
leisure time in addition to working time. The loss of enjoyment suffered by the victim on his
death is not limited to deprivation of consumption. It extends to cover the fact that he can no
longer undertake other activities promoting his or her well being.4
Many European countries, Australia, and the USA apply such methods for valuation
of human life and losses due to injuries in connection with road accident prevention
programs. A fatality can be valued at as much as US$ 2 million and a very serious injury at
US$ 1.5 million based on these methods. Estimates of the human costs of accidents can be
used to justify major road safety programs, some of them quite costly to the road transport
sector.
The method selected for evaluating the human cost to individuals of mine accidents in
Afghanistan will be close to the Value of Lost Lifetime Years approach. It will include the
estimated loss of productive capacity to society and reduced opportunities for the victim to
conduct activities important for personal welfare, including private consumption and the
estimated value of leisure time. The calculations presented here constitute a first effort to
evaluate the reduced human losses from mine accidents as benefits attributable to mine
clearance activities in Afghanistan. Both the method applied and the data used are subject to
further revisions and refinements.
The starting point for these calculations is an estimate of the social value of
production for an individual mine victim. Information about the age structure and other
characteristics of mine victims is extracted from Figure 5.1. The SEIS study observes that a
considerable share (about 40%) of the victims were educated, at least having completed
primary education, and that about half of the victims were responsible for supporting their
families. Thus it can be assumed that most mine victims belonging to the economically
active age groups (18-65 years) are contributing positively to national economic activity. An
4

European Commission Transport Research Cost 313: Socioeconomic cost of road accidents, 1994.
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unemployment rate of 40% will be applied, however, to take into account Afghanistan’s very
weak economy. The economic situation of mine victims is thus different from refugees or
internally displaced persons returning to reclaim land cleared of mines, who generally will be
assumed to have no alternative possibilities for employment (see Section 6).
The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of a poor country can be as little as US$ 200 per
inhabitant per year. For Afghanistan, no National Accounts statistics exist at present, so a
rough estimate of US$ 200 for average per-capita income per year will be used. It can be
assumed that the largest part of the GDP is created by people in the age group of 20-65 years.
By applying estimates for the number of persons in that age group in Afghanistan5 and
assuming an unemployment rate of 40%, it can be estimated that each active, employed
person in a poor country (with an average per-capita GDP of US$ 200) would contribute
about US$ 750 annually to GNP. This will be used as the basis for estimating the potential
annual economic contribution from a mine victim (96% of them males) in the age groups of
18-40 years and above 40 years. It will also be used to estimate the potential economic
contribution of young persons once they reach productive age.
GDP includes private consumption, but it is limited to marketed goods and services.
The value of non-marketed economic activity and production for own use should be added,
which could increase the production value estimate to US$ 850 per person per year.
Estimation of a mine accident victim’s personal loss of welfare inevitably is arbitrary,
but it can be assumed to be at least equal to the individual’s productive contribution. So the
conservative estimate used here will be an additional US$ 850 per person per year, whereas
estimates from industrialized countries often constitute a much higher additional percentage.
Table 5.4: Estimates of Productive Contribution and
Loss of Welfare for Mine Victims
Contribution to GDP
Value of non-marketed, subsistence production
Productive contribution from an economic active mine victim
Victim loss of welfare

US$/year
750
100
850
850

A 30-year-old male can be treated as representative of the middle of the age group
18-40 among mine victims. His remaining life expectancy is about 35 years in Afghanistan.6
There is also a risk of loss of a person’s productive capacity for reasons other than death and
mine accidents. An average productive lifetime of 30 years will thus be assumed for the age
group of 18-40 years. For the age group over 40, the productive lifetime is assumed to be 10
years and life expectancy 15 years. Victims under 18 are assigned a remaining life
expectancy of 50 years and a remaining productive life of 40 years when they reach
productive age, on average after 10 years. Future contributions are all discounted at a 10%
annual rate.
5
6

Mohammad Ershad: Paper on the population of Afghanistan, IIPS Bombay, June 1983.
Ibid.
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The individual age groups of the population in Afghanistan are assumed to contribute
to lost production value and welfare loss according to their shares in the total number of mine
accident victims, which are shown in Figure 5.1. As mentioned earlier, for calculation of the
lost production value an unemployment rate of 40% is assumed. This reduces the estimated
production loss to 60% of the estimated contribution, i.e. $450 per year for persons in the
productive age groups.
The total human loss per person for a typical fatal mine accident casualty is calculated
in net present value terms in Table 5.5. The resulting estimate of less than $12,000 is very
low, reflecting Afghanistan’s deep poverty and the conservative approach and assumptions
used. The estimated human loss for other, non-fatal categories of victims will be less and
will depend on the degree of disability, as discussed later in this Section.
Table 5.5: Production and Welfare Loss per Person, Fatal Casualty, US$
Production loss
Age group under 18
Age group 18-40
Age group over 40
Welfare loss
Age group under 18
Age group 18-40
Age group over 40

5.3

Years

Loss US$
% of victims
Over lifetime
34
3 211
53
8 013
13
5 223

Loss US$
relative share
655
2 548
407

50
34
8 434
35
53
8 198
15
13
6 465
Economic loss per person fatal casualty

2 868
4 345
840
11 663

40 (+10)
30
10

Medical Costs

Mine accident victims constitute a heavy burden on the scarce resources available for
medical treatment in Afghanistan. ICRC reports that over 80% of all amputations performed
at their hospitals are on victims of landmines. Patients with serious injuries from a landmine
will need hospital treatment for about 30 days on the average. The cost per patient-day at an
ICRC hospital is around US$ 120, excluding salaries of expatriate staff. The average cost for
treating a mine-injured person in an ICRC hospital will therefore be around US$ 3,500. For
most Afghan families, this would be an unattainable amount. At ICRC hospitals all treatment
is free of charge, but nevertheless treatment capacity and resources are being diverted from
other patients. So there is a high opportunity cost involved, and the resources used for mine
accident victims have valuable alternative uses. In any case, the victim and his/her family
may also have to cover additional expenses like transport.
Many mine accident victims do not receive professional medical treatment, which
may contribute to a higher death toll and to more permanent, debilitating injuries. As a
result, however, medical costs per victim would be somewhat lower on average than the
hospital rates. Thus it is assumed that medical costs will amount to US$ 2,000 per victim in
the case of casualties leading to blindness, amputation, and other severe injuries.
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5.4

Total Human Loss in Socio-economic Terms

The estimated socio-economic loss shown in Table 5.5 constitutes the loss
attributable to a fatal human casualty. The death toll from mine accidents in Afghanistan is
estimated at 31% of the total number of victims. The proportion of different types of
casualties can be taken into account in accordance with their respective degree of disability.
The estimated contribution of each category of mine accident victim to the human loss is
shown in Table 5.6, based on the proportion of different categories of injuries and
assumptions about the degree of disability entailed by each category of injuries relative to a
fatality. Medical costs are also added, at the rate of US$ 2,000 per victim for casualties
leading to blindness, amputation, and other severe injuries. The economic loss for a typical
mine victim calculated on this composite basis is about US$ 9,000.
Table 5.6: Economic Loss for a Typical Mine Accident Victim, US$
Categories
Disability %
Death
100 %
Blind
70 %
Amputation
60 %
Severe injury
50 %
Light injury
20 %
Economic loss for a typical mine victim

Victims %
31 %
6%
40 %
12 %
11 %

Loss US$
3 616
610
3 599
940
257
9,021

The total human loss in socio-economic terms can now be distributed across the
various types of mined areas according to the accident risk estimates presented in Table 5.3.
As long as mined areas are not cleared, the risk of mine accidents will persist, and human
casualties may continue to recur every year. So a 15-year time horizon is used, during which
the human loss will be calculated and discounted at 10%.
Experience indicates, however, that the accident risk from active mined areas
decreases somewhat over time, even when no clearance has been conducted. Local people
may adapt themselves in various ways to the dangers of mines, taking precautions and
modifying their behavior. Mine awareness campaigns may have a significant impact in this
respect, as well as the survey, delineation, and marking of minefields. Such risk reduction
activities also carry some costs. Return of refugees, on the other hand, may well offset any
declining trend and increase accident rates. For the purpose of the cost-benefit analysis in
this study, it is conservatively assumed that accident rates will decrease by 5% every year
over the 15 year time horizon under consideration, if no mine clearance activity occurs.
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Table 5.7: Human Loss in US$ 1000 from Risk of Accidents on Different Types
of Mined Area per km2, Annually and Over 15 Years Discounted at 10%
Type of area

Accident risk
Annual loss
Total human loss over
victims/km2
US$ 1000
15 years, US$ 1000*
Residential/commercial
17
154
914
Roads
17
154
914
Irrigation systems
17
154
914
Agricultural land
11
103
610
Grazing areas
6
51
305
Average for all mined areas
10
90
535
One victim each year over 15 years**
1
9
69
* A reduction in accident risk of 5% per year over the 15 years period is assumed.
** No risk reduction assumed.

With an accident risk of 10 victims per km2 of minefield, the total human loss as an
average for all types of areas is estimated at US$ 90,000 km2 annually. This translates into a
net present value of loss of more than US$ 0.5 million per km2 when the area concerned
remains uncleared during a 15 year period. Each type of mined area carries different levels
of accident risk, and the human loss from accidents varies accordingly.
5.5

Alternative Assumptions

Although mine accidents unquestionably lead to major human welfare losses, these
are difficult and somewhat arbitrary to measure and inevitably become a source of contention
no matter what estimates or methodology are used. The estimated welfare loss can be
excluded for the purpose of sensitivity analysis, not because this is unimportant or
necessarily overstated, but rather to come up with a more conservative estimate of the
benefits of de-mining that are directly attributable to economic activities. Table 5.8 shows
the revised estimates of human losses resulting from exclusion of welfare losses (with all
other assumptions maintained as in Table 5.7). The average annual human loss per km2 with
welfare losses excluded comes to US$36,000, which translates into a total discounted loss of
about US$ 210,000 over a 15-year period.
As a further sensitivity check, since the calculations of human loss are based on the
estimated incidence of mine accidents (for which reliable nationwide data are lacking), it can
be very conservatively assumed that instead of 4,000 mine accident victims per year, there
are only 2,000. This almost certainly substantially understates the incidence of mine
accidents, but nevertheless it is useful for the purposes of sensitivity analysis to make use of
a rock-bottom calculation of the human loss from mine accidents. The combination of
excluding the estimated welfare loss and halving the estimated rate of mine accident
casualties results in estimates of the total human loss which are exactly half of those shown
in Table 5.8.
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Table 5.8: Human Loss Based on Alternative Assumption Excluding Welfare Loss
Type of area

Accident risk
Annual loss
Total human loss over
Victims/km2
US$ 1000
15 years, US$ 1000*
Residential/commercial
17
61
364
Roads
17
61
364
Irrigation systems
17
61
364
Agricultural land
11
41
243
Grazing areas
6
20
121
Average for all mined areas
10
36
213
One victim each year over 15 years**
1
4
27
* A reduction in accident risk of 5% per year over the 15 years period is assumed.
** No risk reduction assumed.
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6.
6.1

Agricultural Land Blocked by Mines1

The Agricultural Sector’s Role in Afghanistan’s Economy

Afghanistan is an agricultural country, and traditionally around 70% of the labor
force has been engaged in agriculture-related activities. Agricultural production is one of the
main components of Afghanistan’s the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Before 1979, the
contribution of agriculture comprised of more than 50% of total GDP.
In 1978, the last year of peace before the Soviet invasion, the country was largely
self-sufficient in food and was a significant exporter of agricultural products. Official Afghan
statistics from the period 1971-1989 show annual exports of agricultural products of more
than US$ 100 million, constituting over 30% of the total exports of the country. The main
export items were fresh and dried fruits, citrus fruits, and oilseeds. After the intensification
of war activities, agricultural production decreased considerably. There was subsequently a
recovery of agricultural production in the 1990s, concentrated in areas free of fighting,
especially the Taliban-controlled areas in Southern, Eastern, and Western Afghanistan. This
recovery was cut short by the current three-year drought, which halved food production and
devastated horticultural production and livestock. As a result of the drought, Afghanistan’s
food deficit has widened alarmingly, and there has been widespread displacement of
population.
In Afghanistan, 85% of the agricultural output comes from about 5% of the land – the
fertile and productive river valleys – which to a large extent consist of irrigated areas. Three
quarters of the total land area, on the other hand, supports only sparse grazing in
mountainous and arid areas. Basic data on agricultural land use in Afghanistan prior to the
war are shown in Table 6.1.
Table 6.1: Land area and use of land in Afghanistan, 1972
km2
Irrigated land
– Orchards
802
– Cereal crops, 2 times a year
4,514
– Cereal crops, once a year
7,337
– Intermittently cropped
20,230
Total irrigated
32,883
Rainfed-only 20-25% cropped every year
48,357
Forest area
19,870
Rangeland and other
541,285
Total land area
642,395
Source: FAO Land Use Statistics, 1972

1

%
2
14
22
62
100

%

5
8
3
84
100

This section has benefited in particular from co-operation with the FAO office in Islamabad as well as
different FAO reports and publications and the survey undertaken by the Swedish Committee of Afghanistan
(SCA). However, responsibility for the use of this data in this study and the specific conclusions drawn rests
with the authors.
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Estimates for 1996 of the production of principal crops and average yields in tons per
km are presented in Table 6.2.
2

Table 6.2: Principal Crops and Yields in Afghanistan,
Estimates for 1996
Area km2

Yield
Tons/ km2
Wheat
36,000
170
Barley
3,100
115
Maize
4,850
170
Rice
2,150
210
Cotton
800
145
Sugar cane
45
2
Sugar beet
20
2
Fruit orchards, citrus
700
43
Vegetables
900
790
Source: FAO Integrated Crop Program Estimates

6.2

Mines in Agricultural Areas

A total of 89 km2 of agricultural land has been cleared of landmines during the period
from 1990 to 2000. According to MAPA’s estimates,2 a total of 153 km2 of high-priority
agricultural land still remained to be cleared by the end of 1999. Another 26 km2 of minecontaminated agricultural land has been assigned lower priority.
Table 6.3: Mines in Agricultural Areas, km2
Year
Cleared land km2
Remaining by 2000
– High priority
– other area

6.3

1990-2000
89.1

1999
17.6

1998
14.1

1997
11.8

1996
8.1

1995
6.6

1994
6.6

153.2
26.2

The Case Studies

The data used in this study should be comprehensive and detailed enough to cover all
of Afghanistan, and to give a representative picture of the various different types of
agricultural areas relevant in a mine clearance context. There are, however, serious gaps and
deficiencies in the available data on Afghanistan.
It has therefore been necessary to collect and analyze economic data for a limited
number of stylized case studies. The individual cases have been designed so as to represent
as best possible the full range of different agricultural conditions in Afghanistan. In the
interest of manageability, the area covered by each case study coincides with the boundaries
of one or a group of provinces. District-level case studies would be too detailed. Moreover, a
restricted number of cases have been selected, which could be expanded later. In the
agriculture and livestock sectors, the need for a minimum of eight stylized case studies has
2

Source: MAPA Annual Workplan for Year 2000.
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been identified, in order to cover the major climatic zones, main cropping and livestock
holding patterns, and cultivation practices.
The stylized case studies are based on farming models developed from the Swedish
Committee for Afghanistan’s agricultural survey of 1991. They describe the farming
systems prevailing in different agro-ecological zones, which can be considered representative
of the climatic variations across the country. The basic features of these models are described
in terms of location, altitude, precipitation, type of irrigation, farm and household size, crop
production, farm inputs, draught power, and livestock production.
Cropping intensity varies among the eight case studies. Depending on micro-climate
and availability of water, some areas with fertile soil and high temperature can be cultivated
more than once per year, whereas other agricultural land can be used only once every two to
three years. Some districts of Laghman and Nangarhar can be cropped up to three times per
year, whereas large areas in the Northern Region, rain-fed land in particular, must remain
fallow for 3-4 years or even longer at a time. The irrigated agricultural lands which are not
being cropped every year can be used as grazing areas or left unused to increase nitrogen
content.
Together, the stylized case studies are considered to be representative of over 95% of
Afghanistan’s irrigated agricultural land and 85% of rain-fed land. Case study I covers a
mixed extensive rain fed and irrigated cropping system, whereas case studies II-VIII are
concerned only with irrigated cropping systems. This means that the associated cost-benefit
analysis relates primarily to productive agricultural land that has regular access to irrigation
water.
The provinces covered by the eight case studies for the agricultural and livestock
sectors are shown in Table 6.4 and illustrated in the map that follows. Out of the 29
provinces in Afghanistan, only two provinces – Bamiyan and Ghor – are not covered by the
case studies. These provinces are not densely mined; no clearance report has yet been
received from Ghor, and less than 0.5 km2 have been cleared in Bamiyan.
Table 6.4: Case Study Areas
Case Study
I
II
III
IV
V
VI
VII
VIII

Provinces, Regions
Northern Region all provinces*
Parwan, Kabul, Kapisa.
Logar, Wardak.
Nangarhar, Laghman, Kunar
Kandahar, Zabul, Oruzgan
Ghazni, Paktika, Paktia
Helmand
Herat, Badghis, Farah, Nimroz

*The Northern Region consists of the provinces of Faryab, Jawzjan,

Balkh, Samangan, Kunduz, Baghlan, Takhar, Badakhstan.
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6.4

Economic Benefits From De-mining Agricultural Land

For the purposes of the cost-benefit analysis conducted in this study, it is assumed
that agricultural areas will be put into productive use immediately after being cleared of
mines. There is considerable demand for agricultural land in the country to feed the
population and provide livelihoods for returning refugees. Besides, according to
MAPA’s guidelines, an area will not be given first priority for clearance if there is
considered to be a significant chance that it will not be reclaimed for use immediately.
The economic benefits from agricultural land consist of the net revenue to the
farmer from the associated agricultural production, which in this report is calculated on
an annual average basis and per km2 of area. For each of the eight agricultural case
studies, a crop pattern assumed to be representative for the region has been identified,
consisting of the percentage share of land area devoted to each different crop.
Regional variations in cropping intensity have been taken into account. Cropping
intensity varies, in particular, with rainfall and access to irrigation water. Regional
variations in yields also have been taken into account, and also in the output prices to
farmers to some extent. Factor inputs and their prices have been considered standard for
different crops and regions.
It is assumed that cleared agricultural land constitutes a source of livelihood for
Afghans who otherwise lack a means to support themselves and their families, as jobless
or substantially underemployed, receiving help either from friends and relatives or from
international assistance agencies. (They could be living inside Afghanistan or as refugees
in other countries.) In cost-benefit analysis it makes no difference whether refugees were
actually working abroad, as conventionally benefit and cost calculations stop at the
national border. In any case, return of refugees is considered to be an important goal in
its own right by the assistance community for Afghanistan. For these reasons, no
deduction has been made for the economic opportunity cost of farm labor input for
agricultural production, as this input is assumed to have no alternative productive
employment in general.
The agricultural practices in the case studies are assumed to represent typical
patterns rather than recommended or ideal practice. It is not the actual (drought-affected)
situation in Afghanistan today that should taken into account, but rather the conditions
that could be expected to prevail with more normal weather and stable conditions. As is
the case with other components of the cost-benefit analysis, the economic benefits from
agricultural land are valued over a 15-year time horizon using a discount rate of 10% p.a.
The calculation method used for each of the eight case studies, with the results
shown in Tables 6.6 to 6.13, can be briefly described as follows:
• The selection of crops is assumed to be typical for the region covered by each of the
eight case studies.
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•

•
•
•

Information was gathered from different sources on yields in tons per km2 area for
different types of crops, and the average yield per km2 of agricultural land is
calculated on the basis of figures in FAO agricultural models. As expected,
significant regional variations are found.
The prices used in the calculation of gross revenue per km2 are the market prices for
May/June 2000, which are reported through FAO sub-offices from different regions.
A certain degree of regional variation also is found in prices of agricultural products.
Harvest yield times price gives the gross revenue of production from one km2 of
agricultural land. (This is not shown in Tables 6.6 to 6.13 but is the product of the
first two columns in the tables.)
In order to derive the net revenue per unit of land area, the value of non-factor inputs
needs to be deducted. In Tables 6.6 to 6.13, this has been calculated as the amount of
inputs required for the output of specific agricultural crops on one km2 of land. In the
case of irrigated wheat in Table 6.5, for example, it is estimated that US$ 10,700
worth of inputs is needed to produce 150 tons of output. Farm inputs include seeds,
chemical fertilizers, manure, pesticides, and hired oxen or tractor draught power.

The use of fertilizer and chemical protection material and all other inputs is
estimated according to availability of inputs, affordability for the farmers, and farmers’
access to them. Hence the inputs recommended by the Ministry of Agriculture and FAO
are much higher than the farm inputs estimated in this report. Irrigation cost has not been
taken into account, because normally river or Karez (traditional underground irrigation
channels) water is being used for irrigation purposes except in drought-affected areas.
Management costs also are not taken into account, and neither is the farmers’ daily use of
farm products such as fruit, vegetables, or firewood.
• To estimate the cost of fertilizer inputs we consider the total active irrigated land and
the amount of fertilizer distributed in the country. A total of 157,700 tons of fertilizer
was distributed to farmers in 1986, while the active irrigated land was 26,000 km2 in
1993. Assuming that fertilizer use remained constant during this period, the average
use of fertilizer would be 6.1 tons per km2. A bag of 50 kg white fertilizer (UREA)
costs around US$ 16, so the estimated fertilizer cost per km2 of farmland would be
US$ 1,620.
• Usually oxen and tractors are used as power for cultivation of land. The cost of both
types of power is on average roughly US$ 2000/ km2.
• It has to be taken into account that the provinces covered by the case studies all have
cropping intensities different from 1. This means that either more or less than one
crop can be harvested each year. The intensity varies from 0.35 in Case 1 or about
one crop in the course of 3 years, to 1.92 in case study IV, that is almost 2 crops a
year normally.
• When the cropping intensity is lower than 1, it is assumed that land is available for
grazing animals in years without agricultural planting. The annual forage value from
a km2 of land is assumed to be in line with the outputs for grazing areas, as described
in section 8.
• The recent exchange rate of 1US$ = Afs. 60,000 has been used for converting
monetary values of yield and farm inputs into US dollars.
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In each of the Tables 6.6 to 6.13, the revenues for each type of crop (last column)
is calculated in the following way: The harvest yield is multiplied by the output price and
the cost of input factors is subtracted. The remaining net revenue is then multiplied by
each crop’s share (%) of land use and the cropping intensity specific for each Case Study
region.
Table 6.5: Case Study I, Northern Region*
Annual Net Revenue from Agricultural Land, US$ per km2
Crops

Harvest yield
tonnes/km2

Price
Input factors
Land use Revenues
US$/tonne
US$ per km2
US$
Irrigated wheat
252
10700
150
24 %
2 276
Rainfed wheat
250
5500
94
33 %
2 079
Barley
200
5000
80
17 %
655
Rice
500
8650
186
26 %
7 676
Grazing (remaining part of time)
1 349
Annual net revenue US$ per km2 agricultural land
14 035
Cropping intensity
Grazing time

0.35
0.65
* The Northern Region consists of the provinces of Faryab, Jawzjan,
Balkh, Samangan, Kunduz, Baghlan, Takhar, Badakhshan.

Table 6.6: Case Study II, The Provinces of Parwan, Kabul, Kapisa.
Annual Net Revenue from Agricultural Land, US$ per km2.
Crops

Harvest yield
Tonnes/km2

Price
Input factors
Land use
Revenues
US$/tonne
US$ per km2
US$
189
252
10700
45 %
26 588
88
170
7050
15 %
1 898
175
670
8600
30 %
52 152
350
34
4850
10 %
1 128
Annual net revenue US$ per km2 agricultural land
81 767

Irrigated wheat
Maize
Beans
Forage crops
Cropping intensity

1.6

Table 6.7: Case Study III, The Provinces of Logar, Wardak
Annual Net Revenue from Agricultural Land, US$ per km2.
Crops
Irrigated wheat
Potato
Fruits
Forage crops
Rice
Cropping intensity

Harvest yield
tonnes/km2

Price
Input factors
Land use
Revenues
US$/tonne
US$ per km2
US$
189
250
10700
30 %
15 132
2275
136
15950
15 %
60 744
1750
240
8750
15 %
85 129
360
35
4850
35 %
3 743
175
250
8650
5%
2 422
Annual net revenue US$ per km2 agricultural land
167 170
1.38
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Table 6.8: Case Study IV, The Provinces of Nangarhar, Laghman, Kunar.
Annual Net Revenue from Agricultural Land, US$ per km2.
Crops

Harvest yield
tonnes/km2

Irrigated wheat
Rice
Forage crops

Price
US$/tonne

Input factors
Land use
Revenues
US$ per km2
US$
189
255
10700
28 %
20 157
350
450
8650
38 %
108 601
380
38
4850
34 %
6 260
2
Annual net revenue US$ per km agricultural land
135 019

Cropping intensity

1.92

Table 6.9: Case Study V, The Provinces of Kandahar, Zabul, Oruzgan.
Annual Net Revenue from Agricultural Land, US$ per km2.
Crops

Harvest yield
tonnes/km2

Irrigated wheat
Pomegranates
Apples
Apricots
Potato
Forage crops

Price
Input factors
Land use Revenues
US$/tonne
US$ per km2
US$
175
250
10700
22 %
10 907
2500
245
8750
18 %
163 013
1050
335
8750
10 %
51 450
525
1 200
8750
10 %
93 188
588
140
15950
10 %
9 956
370
40
4850
30 %
4 478
Annual net revenue US$ per km2 agricultural land
332 990

Cropping intensity

1.5

Table 6.10: Case Study VI, The provinces of Ghazni, Paktika, Paktia.
Annual net revenue from agricultural land, US$ per km2
Crops

Harvest yield
tonnes/km2

Irrigated wheat
Potato
Forage crops
Grazing
Cropping intensity
Grazing time

Price
US$/tonne

Input factors
Land use
Revenues
US$ per km2
US$
179
250
10700
73 %
19 140
1050
140
15950
5%
5 045
3500
40
4850
22 %
22 894
296
2
Annual net revenue US$ per km agricultural land
47 375
0.77
0.23

Table 6.11: Case Study VII, The Provinces of Helmand
Annual Net Revenue from Agricultural Land, US$ per km2.
Crops
Irrigated wheat
Cotton
Maize
Alfalfa
Other
Cropping intensity

Harvest yield
Price
Input factors
Land use
Revenues
tonnes/km2
US$/tonne
US$ per km2
US$
220
245
10700
52 %
37 290
140
400
7650
14 %
11 237
192
170
7050
17 %
7 221
390
34
4850
5%
698
181
249
12592
12 %
6 450
Annual net revenue US$ per km2 agricultural land
62 896
1.66
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Table 6.12: Case Study VIII, The Province of Herat, Badghis, Farah, Nimroz
Annual Net Revenue from Agricultural Land, US$ per km2
Crops

Harvest yield
tonnes/km2

Irrigated wheat
Maize
Bean
Clover
Rainfed carabie
Cropping intensity

Price
Input factors
Land use
Revenues
US$/tonne
US$ per km2
US$
189
235
10700
45 %
24 275
160
145
7050
12 %
3 101
155
520
8600
22 %
25 344
350
38
4850
12 %
1 622
55
833
5900
9%
5 748
Annual net revenue US$ per km2 agricultural land
60 090
1.6

In some areas of Afghanistan, opium poppy and cannabis have formed integral
parts of the cropping pattern and have played an important role in the economy. Case
studies IV, V and VII comprise districts that have been important poppy-growing areas.
However, incomes from illicit crops appropriately are not included as benefits in this
study. Before clearance of any agricultural land, the landowner is required to give a
solemn promise not to cultivate any illicit crop on the cleared land and to sign a contract
to this effect. Even more important, the Taliban authorities’ ban on opium poppy
cultivation by all accounts has been effective. If this ban remains in force and continues
to be effectively enforced, concerns about use of de-mined agricultural land for poppy
cultivation would be alleviated.
As in the case of other components of the cost-benefit analysis, a time horizon of
15 years has been used for the benefits from reclaimed agricultural land after mine
clearance. Discounted at 10% p.a. over the whole period, the benefits gained during the
early years will carry a large weight in the total net discounted value of benefits, whereas
the benefits after 15 years will have relatively little importance.
The net annual value of agricultural production shows wide variations, from US$
14,000 annually in the Northern Region (Case Study I) to over US$ 300,000 in the
provinces of Kandahar, Zabul, and Oruzgan (Case Study V). The Total Value in Table
6.13, comprising annual values discounted over 15 years, will constitute one of the
benefit components to be compared with the cost of clearing one km2 of agricultural land.
Table 6.13: Agricultural Land, Net Output Value in US$ 1000 of Production
from one km2 Annually and Discounted over 15 Years at 10% Discount Rate
Annual Value
US$ 1000
Case Study I
Case Study II
Case Study III
Case Study IV
Case Study V
Case Study VI
Case Study VII
Case Study VIII

14
82
167
135
333
47
63
60
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Total Value US$ 1000
over 15 years
107
622
1 272
1 027
2 533
360
478
457

7.
7.1

Irrigation Systems Blocked by Mines

The Role of Irrigation in Afghanistan

The origin of irrigated agriculture in Afghanistan dates back more than 4,500 years,
and irrigation systems remain vital for agricultural production. Between 85% and 90% of all
crops are grown under irrigation. There are numerous different types of irrigation systems,
depending on streams, canals, springs, karezes (traditional underground irrigation channels),
and arhats (Persian wheels), depending on water availability and farm location. Irrigation
systems can be divided into two main categories: traditional and modern, each sub-divided
into a number of sub-types.
Traditional Irrigation Systems:
Arhat: Ground water is lifted from shallow wells with the help of a Persian wheel (Arhat),
supplying irrigation water for the fields of an individual farmer. The size of the area irrigated
by a single arhat does not exceed 0.03 km2.
Karez (Qanat): This system is used in steep areas. Underground water is brought into free
flow through tunnels from alluvial aquifers. Karezes are dug by local craftsmen as shafts at
close intervals; they are usually narrow but may be many km in length. Discharge varies
between 10 to 500 litres per second. The irrigated area is in the range of 1-2 km2. Karez
water can also be used for drinking water.
Small-scale traditional water systems are supplied by stream flow diverted with the help of
temporary brush weirs. Often situated in remote valleys along a stream or river, they vary in
size, irrigating up to 1 km2. The villagers themselves are responsible for arrangements and
maintenance.
Medium-scale traditional surface water systems are supplied by river flow diverted with
the help of brush weirs, and can irrigate the agricultural land of several villages. Size can be
from 1 to 20 km2. They are operated by villagers in a similar way as small-scale or large
scale irrigation systems.
Large-scale traditional surface water systems are supplied by river flow diverted with the
help of temporary brush weirs. Extending over areas up to 2,000 km2, they are located on
flat plains and along the main valleys. Their operation and maintenance are highly structured
and involve several communities, sometimes of different ethnic origins. Each village has at
least one water master (Mirab), responsible for allocation of water to the different plots of the
scheme.
Modern Irrigation Systems include:
• Modern surface water systems without storage;
• Modern surface water systems with storage;
• Modern ground water systems (using mechanical pumps driven by fossil fuels as
electricity).
Cropping intensity varies widely from system to system depending on the availability
of water in relation to land and also on climatic conditions. It can reach a level of two in the
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upper part of the irrigation schemes, while in the lower parts up to two-thirds of the area may
be kept fallow each year on a rotational basis.
Table 7.1: Irrigated Land in Afghanistan by Type of Irrigation Source
Type of irrigation source
Number
Area cultivated in km2.

Streams and
Springs
Kareze
canals
7822
5558
6741
20180
1870
1670
Source: Afghan Agriculture in Figures, 1978

Arhat (Persian
wheel)
8595
120

At present, more than two-thirds of Afghanistan’s irrigation schemes are not
operating satisfactorily. It is estimated that 10% of all irrigation systems in Afghanistan were
directly affected by the war. More important ultimately have been the effects of neglect and
abandonment. A principal reason for irrigation systems falling into disuse is landmines,
which interferes with their use (although in the short run water flow may not be disrupted)
and prevent routine and periodic maintenance (such as de-silting).
7.2

Economic Benefits from De-mining Irrigation Systems

A total area of eight km2 of irrigation systems has been de-mined under the mine
action program (as of the year 2000). According to MAPA assessments1, 3.8 km2 of highpriority irrigation systems remain to be cleared. Another 0.6 km2 of mine infested irrigation
systems have been identified and assigned lower priority.
Table 7.2: Mines in Irrigation Systems, km2
Year
Cleared land km2.
Remaining by 2000
– high priority
– other area

1990-2000
1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 1994
8.0
1.2
0.4
0.7
0.5
0.7
1.3
3.8
0.6

Since irrigation systems provide water for agricultural use, the economic benefit from
mine clearance is the resulting agricultural production. Therefore, the data used for analysis
of mine clearance in agricultural areas in Section 6 will also be applied in the case of
irrigation systems. The benefits to agriculture from clearance of irrigation systems will
consist of the potential for expanded and improved use of the areas irrigated by the system.
These areas are much larger than the actual extent of the irrigation system itself.
There is no fixed relationship between the size of a mined irrigation system and the
area of land irrigated by that system, and large regional as well as local variations in this ratio
may be expected. In fact, each sizeable irrigation system is likely to be different in this
regard. From the MIS Socio-economic Database, examples of both very high (average 25
times) and smaller ratios can be found.
For the purpose of the cost-benefit analysis, the economic output from the agricultural
land concerned after the irrigation system has been cleared of mines needs to be compared
1

Source: MAPA Annual Workplan for Year 2000.
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with the situation in the absence of mine clearance. Typically some of the agricultural land
will also be mined. In these situations the entire benefit from increased agricultural
production cannot be imputed only to the cleared irrigation system but must be shared with
the clearance of the agricultural land concerned. In cases where the land served by the
irrigation system is not mined, there may be potential for use while the irrigation system
remains mined, even though output will be much lower than with irrigation water fully
available. Use as grazing areas for animals, for example, should be possible. Some water
may still pass through the irrigation canals, even though parts of them cannot be maintained
because of mine contamination. The farmers may also have alternative sources for irrigation
water, or diversion canals may have been made.
Based on these considerations, the actual benefits from clearance of an irrigation
system would not always be the full production from the agricultural land it is serving. Thus
a ratio needs to be assumed between the size of the benefit area and the area of the mined
irrigation system. For the above-mentioned reasons this ratio will be set at a lower level than
generally found in the MIS Socio-economic Database.
It is assumed that the irrigated area benefiting from clearance is three times the actual
size of the mined irrigation system. The main reason for this low ratio is to take into account
the likelihood that in cases of mined irrigation systems, agricultural areas in the same district
also will be mined, implying that benefits will have to be shared. In Case Study I the
agricultural benefits have been reduced by 10%, indicating that not all areas in that region are
dependent on irrigation. Benefits from alternative use of the areas served by the irrigation
systems for grazing animals have been deducted (the source of this data is Table 8.6).
The estimated total benefits from de-mining irrigation systems are shown in Table
7.3. Basic data for these calculations are the benefits from agricultural production in Table
6.13.
The benefits from clearing irrigation areas are substantial, as much as about US$ one
million per year in the provinces of Case Study V. Total value discounted over 15 years is
large in most cases and can justify substantial clearance costs.
Table 7.3: Benefits from De-mining Irrigation Systems, US$ 1,000 per km2
Cleared Irrigation System, Annually and Discounted over 15 years
Annual value
Case Study I
Case Study II
Case Study III
Case Study IV
Case Study V
Case Study VI
Case Study VII
Case Study VIII

36
244
500
404
997
141
187
178
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Total value discounted
over 15 years
272
1 854
3 803
3 069
7 584
1 071
1 422
1 356

8.
8.1

Mine Infested Grazing Areas and Damage to Livestock
The Livestock Sector and its Contribution to the Afghan Economy

Livestock products contributed 16% to Afghanistan’s GDP before 1978 and
accounted for about 14% of the country’s exports, while an additional 9% of exports came
from livestock-related products, mainly carpets and rugs. In addition to their quantitative
significance, livestock are a very important safety net for Afghan households. During the
war large numbers of Afghanistan’s livestock were destroyed together with other farm assets.
Animals in significant numbers also moved out of Afghanistan with refugees.
The livestock population started increasing with the return of Afghan refugees from
Pakistan and Iran in the early 1990s. Prior to the severe drought of the last two years, it was
estimated that the number of cattle, horses and camels had returned to pre-war levels, while
the number of sheep and goats had increased considerably. A World Bank study 1 estimates
the livestock sector’s contribution to Afghanistan’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at US$
508 million for 1998/99. The livestock sector appears to have grown at 2-4% per year from
1995 onwards. Unfortunately, however, the recent drought has hit Afghanistan’s livestock
very hard, and the majority of livestock have been sold, slaughtered, or died due to lack of
water and forage. This damage will take time (and a return to better climatic conditions) to
repair.
Table 8.1 shows the estimated number of different kinds of livestock in Afghanistan
in 1998/99. It is based on FAO figures from 1995/96, assuming that the number of cattle
increased at a rate of 2% annually, and sheep and goats by 3%, in the following years.
Table 8.1: Livestock Rearing in Afghanistan,
Estimates for 1998/99 (Numbers in Thousands)
Cattle
3,919
Sheep
2,4051
Goats
9,758
Horses
389
Donkeys
1,081
Camels
294
Source: Role and size of livestock sector in Afghanistan, World Bank 2000

Livestock production in Afghanistan is mainly based on grazing, and 84% of the
country can be classified as pastures or rangeland (Table 6.1). Livestock in the country seem
to make maximum use of the existing rangelands as well as crop by-products.2 About 40%
of the areas are suitable for grazing during winter. In the higher elevations and mountainous
areas with low temperatures and long snow cover, indoor feeding is practised during winter
for all livestock, and in the uplands and northern Afghanistan for large ruminants only. In
1
2

Source: Role and size of livestock sector in Afghanistan, World Bank 2000.
FAO 1997: Afghanistan Agricultural Strategy, Livestock Production.
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the southern and eastern parts of the country, livestock can be kept outdoors all year round
because of the relatively warm climatic conditions.
The common pattern all over the country is for farmers to have more than one cow,
but even the smallest and poorest farmers normally keep at least one cow. Dry cows, young
stock, and males are usually sent to the hills during the summer. The community manages
the cattle during this period. Sheep and goats are generally kept together and mainly graze
outdoors for the greater part of the year. Sheep and goat flocks migrate from the lowlands to
the highlands during summer. During winter and under severe weather conditions, sheep and
goats are provided shelter and offered supplementary food – hay, straw and tree leaves. They
are also occasionally fed on purchased concentrates. Nomads rear sheep and goats in large
numbers.
The major products from cattle, goats, and sheep are food items, such as beef, mutton,
milk, and other dairy products like cream, butter, curd, yoghurt, ghee and cheese, and also
draught power, wool, hair, pelts, and hides. Production of Karakul pelts, for which
Afghanistan had been famous, is estimated to have declined by 50% due to the non-existence
of dealers and markets, despite a revival of the number of Karakul sheep.
Table 8.2: Prices of Livestock Products (1999)3
and Sector Output (1995-96).4
Cow milk
Sheep and goat milk
Beef
Mutton
Wool
Hair
Cashmere
Karakul pelts
Skins
Hides

US$/kg
0.21
0.93
1.28

Production
680
620
43
104
33
4
250
450
450
6500

Unit
1000 tons
----------Tons
1000
-----

Livestock productivity in Afghanistan is relatively low. The volume of production of
goat and sheep milk is almost on a level with cattle milk. Mutton constitutes a significant part
of total meat production in Afghanistan. There are exports of cattle, sheep, and goats to
Pakistan. All cashmere wool produced in the country is exported, as are about 80% of the
karakul pelts.
Afghanistan can be divided into a number of agro-ecological zones (see Section 6),
each with a different pattern of agricultural production and also with a distinctive pattern of
livestock rearing, numbers and types of cattle per household, utilization of grazing areas, etc.
The grazing season and the resulting need for supplementary fodder can vary widely with the
length of the cold winter season and of dry periods. The different agro-climatic zones form
the basis for the eight case studies for agriculture and livestock rearing in this report.
3
4

Role and size of livestock sector in Afghanistan, World Bank 2000, page 10.
FAO Livestock Office, Islamabad.
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8.2

Economic Benefits from De-mining Grazing Areas

An area of 67.8 km2 of grazing lands had been cleared under the mine action program by the
year 2000. According to MAPA’s assessment,5 there remain 136.6 km2 of high-priority
grazing areas to be cleared. An additional 344.5 km2 of lower-priority mine-infested grazing
areas have been identified.
Table 8.3: Mine Infested Grazing Areas, km2
Year
Cleared grazing areas
Remaining year 2000
– high priority area
– other grazing area

1990-2000
67.8

1999
10.1

1998
10.3

1997
13.2

1996
7.1

1995
9.3

1994
7.3

136.6
344.5

A World Bank study has estimated the livestock sector’s contribution to GDP in
Afghanistan.6 The basic data for this calculation is the number of livestock as presented in
Table 8.1. The sector’s product is composed of the value of its commodity outputs and of
animal draught power. Price information for livestock products was obtained from major
markets, and in order to estimate farmgate prices, current market prices were reduced by
10%. The value of draught power was estimated on the basis of the number of work animals,
average number of days of work, and their feed and maintenance cost. It was also assumed
that the value of draught power and other products constitutes 15% of the value of the
livestock main products, (meat, milk, skin and hides). The number of work animals used in
crop cultivation and for draught purposes was estimated at 14% of the cattle population.
For the calculations in this study, the value of draught power has been set at 9/10 and
other by-products (bones, blood, fat, dung etc.) at 1/10 of the above mentioned 15%. The
output of hides has been distributed on the basis of number of animals, taking into account
that draught animal (horse, donkey, camel) normally will be kept much longer than cattle
(estimated five times as long).
In the World Bank analysis of the livestock sector’s contribution to GDP, the value of
non-factor inputs has been deducted. Inputs for the livestock sector include green and dry
fodder, concentrates, grazing from pastures and rangelands, medicines, and vaccines. It was
estimated in the livestock study that this amounts to 15% of the total value of the livestock
products.
The present analysis has a somewhat different focus. An assessment is needed of the
contribution of grazing areas (pastures and rangelands) to the output of the livestock sector.
First, it is assumed that the areas classified as potential grazing areas in the MAPA database
generally have no alternative productive use other than for grazing animals. Animals can be
sent there for grazing, or fodder can be collected from such lands for feeding animals indoors
during the winter or in the dry season.

5
6

Source: MAPA Annual Workplan for Year 2000.
“Role and Size of Livestock Sector in Afghanistan”, World Bank, 2000.
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Fodder can also be collected on agricultural land, or purchased. The value of the
fodder inputs not coming from the grazing areas in question should be deducted, but not for
that period of the year when livestock can make use of grazing areas.
Medicines and vaccines for animals are seldom used to any significant degree in poor
countries. Some NGOs have distributed livestock medicines in Afghanistan free of charge.
In any case, diseases occur most frequently when animals are fed indoors and are obliged to
live off a low-quality or unvarying diet, and not when they can roam freely outdoors and feed
on a wider selection of plants.
In the present analysis, the 15% input cost estimated in the livestock study will
therefore not be deducted from the gross value added of the livestock sector. The grazing
areas’ contribution to the output of the livestock sector instead is assumed to vary
proportionally with the year that animals can be expected to find fodder on the grazing areas
concerned.
Table 8.4: Net Output Value per Animal per Year (US$)
Cattle
Sheep and goats
Horses
Donkeys
Camels

51
9
31
31
31

Based on the above assumptions, estimates for net output value in US$ per animal per
year were derived and are shown in Table 8.4. For cattle, the output value consists of the
value of cow milk, meat, part of hides, part of draught power, and part of other products. For
sheep and goats, the value of their meat, milk, wool, skin, hair, pelts and part of other
products is aggregated. Horses, donkeys, and camels gain their output value from draught
power, hides, and a proportional share of other products.
The level of productivity of Afghan pastures varies significantly between areas and
from one year to another. FAO estimates average production on the country’s pastures and
rangelands (totalling 547,000 km2) at 70 tons of fodder (as dry matter) per km2 per year, and
50% utilization this fodder by livestock is assumed.7 Given that the grazing areas cleared of
mines under MAPA are all classified as high priority areas, it is reasonable to assume that
they yield at least 50% more than the average. The degree of utilization also can be expected
to be substantially higher than the average, since the high-priority grazing areas are
supposedly located close to settlements. Assuming that the degree of utilization is 80%
results in an estimated yield of 84 tons fodder (in dry matter) per km2 of grazing area per
year.
The number of livestock that can be sustained on this amount of fodder depends on
the composition of the flock and the consumption of each type of animal. On the basis of
FAO data, a cow consumes 2.6 tons of fodder annually (in dry material), and a sheep or goat

7

FAO 1997: Afghanistan Agricultural Strategy, Livestock Production, page 19.
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0.3 tons, while we have assumed that horses, donkeys, and camels consume the overall large
livestock average of 3.1 tons.
The case studies comprise eight different patterns of livestock rearing in Afghanistan
(see Table 8.5). All regions that are of interest in connection with mine clearance are
covered. Livestock rearing practices vary considerably across the regional case studies.
Table 8.5: Livestock Practices, Number of Cattle per Household
in Different Parts of Afghanistan
Case
Provinces, Regions
Cattle Sheep and Goats
Horses, Donkeys,
Study
Camels
I
Northern Region all provinces*
7
230
6
II
Parwan, Kabul, Kapisa, Bamyan
4
3
1
III
Logar, Wardak,
3
3
1
IV
Nangarhar, Laghman, Kunar
3
2
1
V
Kandahar, Zabul, Oruzgan
1
3
0
VI
Ghazni, Paktika, Paktia
3
3
3
VII Helmand
4
12
1
VIII Heart, Badghis, Farah, Nimroz
3
25
1
Fodder consumption, tonnes per livestock/year
2.6
0.3
3.1
* The Northern Region consists of the provinces of Faryab, Jawzjan, Balkh,
Samangan, Kunduz, Baghlan, Takhar, Badakhstan.

The size of the livestock flock that can be sustained on the annual production of one
km2 of grazing area is then calculated, taking into account these regional variations. The
flock in Case Study I can be supported on the grazing land concerned for only about nine
months of the year, whereas in the other cases more livestock could be sustained for a whole
year on the annual production from one km2 of grazing areas than the flocks specified in
Table 8.5. The flocks in each case study are therefore adjusted so as to consume a year’s
production from one km2 exactly, while retaining the composition on livestock typical for the
region concerned.
The resulting flock size is finally multiplied by the net output value per animal per
year from Table 8.4 to derive the net annual output value from livestock rearing on one km2
of grazing area (Table 8.6).
Table 8.6: Net Annual Output Value and Total, 15 Years Discounted Value
from Livestock Rearing on one km2 of Grazing Area (US$)
Case Study
Regions, provinces
Annual Total 15 years
I
Northern Region all provinces*
2076
15791
II
Parwan, Kabul, Kapisa, Bamyan
1556
11834
III
Logar, Wardak
1500
11411
IV
Nangarhar, Laghman, Kunar
1500
11411
V
Kandahar, Zabul, Oruzgan
1905
14487
VI
Ghazni, Paktika, Paktia
1287
9788
VII
Helmand
1707
12986
VIII
Heart, Badghis, Farah, Nimroz
1932
14692
*The Northern Region consists of the provinces of Faryab, Jawzjan, Balkh,
Samangan, Kunduz, Baghlan, Takhar, Badakhstan
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The net output from a flock of livestock, typical for the Northern Region (Case Study
I in table 8.6), consuming exactly the annual production from one km2 of grazing area is
estimated at US$ 2,076. This will constitute a part of the estimated economic benefit from
livestock production when one km2 of grazing area in this region is cleared of mines and
UXO. Benefits of an equal value would be gained from that particular cleared area in future
years as well. The total benefit is calculated as usual over a 15-year time horizon with a 10%
annual discount rate.
As can be seen from Table 8.6, the productive economic benefit from grazing land
varies much less across the regional case studies than does agricultural productivity. All but
one of the case studies falls within the range of US$1,500-2,100 per year, with the remaining
one at around US$1,300. For example, in the Northern Region the total future discounted
benefits from livestock rearing on one km2 of grazing area are estimated at over US$ 15,000,
which, together with the other benefits from clearance of grazing areas, can be compared
with the prevailing costs of mine clearance.
As in the case of agriculture, it is assumed that the grazing areas cleared of mines will
essentially provide a means of living for people who otherwise would be sustained on aid
from the international community or from work in other countries. It can thus be assumed
that the labor power input for the livestock sector will have little opportunity cost.
8.3

Livestock Killed by Mines

Considerable numbers of livestock are lost in mine accidents. The Socio-economic
Study (SEIS) found that a total of 242,100 animals were lost in the areas covered by the
study, which correspond to the areas cleared of mines by MAPA during 1990-1998 (166
km2). SEIS in addition assumed that these areas had remained active minefields and
uncultivated for an average period of 10 years.
Table 8.7: Livestock Reported Killed by Mines
During a 10 Years Period8
SEIS Total
83,500
155,400
3,200
242,100

Cattle
Sheep, goats
Horses, donkeys, camels
Livestock killed by mines

A large number of mines must have been detonated in accidents killing livestock,
even though more than one animal could have been killed in many of the explosions.
Comparison can be made with the actual number of mines found during MAPA mine
clearance operations ─ 210,000 on about 200 km2 of minefields from 1990 until the end of
1999.

8

Source: MCPA 1999 Socio-Economic Impact Study of Landmines and Mine Action Operations in
Afghanistan, page 17.
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From this comparison it could be concluded that as many as half of mines are
inadvertently “cleared” by animals blowing them up. However, some exaggeration or double
counting is suspected, and there is also the possibility that reports to the SEIS study of killed
livestock cover significantly larger areas than the 166 km2 designed as the SEIS study area.
The extent of such areas is unknown, but conceivably they could include all mined areas in
the districts the SEIS covers. Little other information is available on numbers of animals
killed in mine accidents.
It can be assumed that few livestock accidents occur in mined residential areas and
irrigation systems. The number of accidents where animals are killed will therefore be
associated with mined agricultural areas, grazing areas, and roads. It is conservatively
assumed that the mined areas causing accidents where animals are killed are roughly five
times as large as the SEIS study areas, also including low-priority areas in the district. This
gives an accident rate of 36 killed animals annually per km2 of mined area.
Table 8.8: Risk of Livestock Loss Annually per km2 of Mined Land
Agricultural land
Roads
Grazing areas
Value US$ per animal

Animals
killed
36
36
36

Cattle
12
12
12
200

Sheep, goats
23
23
23
40

Horses, donkeys,
Camels
0.5
0.5
0.5
220

The proportion of the different types of livestock killed on each type of land is
assumed to be the same as for all livestock killed. We have no information about differences
in risks to livestock per km2 of mined agricultural land versus roads or grazing areas.
Regional variations, for example on the basis of patterns of livestock holding from the case
studies, have not been introduced at this stage. The source for livestock sales prices is the
SEIS study.9 It should be possible to retain meat value from wounded livestock in some
cases, so 30% of the estimated economic loss on this account is subtracted.
When a minefield remains active and uncleared, animals will continue to be killed in
future years. Still, it would be logical that the accident risk is reduced over time as mines are
exploded. It is therefore assumed that the accident risk decreases by 5% annually over the
period.
The annual and total economic values from loss of livestock (shown in Table 8.9)
constitute benefit components to be included in estimated total benefits, which are then
compared with the cost of mine clearance.

9

Source: MCPA 1999 Socio-Economic Impact Study of Landmines and Mine Action Operations in
Afghanistan, page 17.
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Table 8.9: Economic Loss of Livestock per km2 of Mined Areas, US$ Annual Loss and
Total Loss Discounted over 15 Years at 10% Discount Rate
Annual
Total*
Agricultural land
2441
14467
Roads
2441
14467
Grazing areas
2441
14467
* An annual 5% reduction in accident rate over the 15 years is assumed.
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9.
9.1

Roads and Transportation Systems Blocked by Mines

The Transportation System in Afghanistan

Roads constitute the backbone of the transportation network in landlocked
Afghanistan. The total length of all roads in the country was estimated at about 17,000 km in
1978, of which 2,700 km were paved roads. No railways exist in the country, although lines
have been built all the way to the border in Pakistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.
Table 9.1: Road system in Afghanistan 1978
km
2,700
4,300
10,000
17,000

Paved roads
Gravel roads
Tracks and dirt roads
Total

The principal agricultural areas and major population centers are linked by roads
which cut through the Hindu Kush mountains in the central part of the country, connecting
Kabul in the east with Baghlan and Mazar-i-Sharif in the north, Kandahar in the south, and
Herat in the west. Distribution of food from surplus to deficit areas has always been an
important transport task. Deterioration of the road network from war activities, general lack
of maintenance, and closure of principal roads by mines has in certain periods contributed to
higher food prices.
9.2

Economic Benefits from Clearing Roads of Mines

In the MAPA database, mine-contaminated road areas have been registered in terms
of km to correspond with other mined areas. It is assumed that road areas infested with
mines are 20 m wide on average. The 27.9 km2 of road area that has been cleared thus would
correspond to 1,395 km of road length.
2

Table 9.2: Roads Blocked by Mines
Year
Cleared km2.
Cleared roads km
Remaining by 2000
– high priority km
– other roads km

1990-2000
27.9
1,395

1999
2.1
105

1998
5.3
265

1997
4.1
205

1996
3.2
160

1995
2.4
120

1994
2.5
125

1,605
391

MAPA estimates1 indicate that a total length of 1,605 km of high-priority roads
remain to be cleared. Another 391 km of mined roads have been identified but assigned
lower priority.

1

Source: MAPA Survey Database.
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Some basic data are available from the MAPA socio-economic database on road
transport in Afghanistan. In the survey connected to the SEIS study, data were collected from
524 cleared high-priority minefields classified as roads. At the time of the survey, these
roads were all cleared and in use. The data are the best available but nevertheless may be
distorted. For example, many entries with value “0” are suspected to be “no reply” rather
than the value 0, which can distort calculation of averages.
On the assumption that traffic could make use of other routes or diversions before
mine clearance, questions about reduced travel distance, saved travel time, and saved travel
cost were asked in the survey. In Table 9.3 this information has been used to calculate some
key indicators for road transport:
• Saved road transport distance in km per km of road cleared of mines (Saved km/km
road).
• Vehicle speed in km per hour (Km/hour).
• Passengers transported per vehicle (Pass/vehicle).
• Passenger travel cost in US cents per km road (Travel cost USc/km).
Information was also collected on traffic and on vehicles per day on the road. For the
purposes of the cost-benefit analysis, each vehicle is considered as a small business, where
the passenger fares (passenger travel costs) cover all operational and capital costs.
Table 9.3: Road Transport in Afghanistan
Province
Case Study Kandahar,
IX
Laghman, Kabul
Case Study X Other provinces
Total/average

Roads Roads Saved km Saved km/ Vehicles/ Km/hour
Pass/ Travel cost
no
km
km road
day
vehicle USc/km
141 946
434
0.5
622
15
2.6
2.9
383 841
1480
1.8
32
524 1786
1914
1.1
191
Source: MAPA Socio-economic Database

11
12

8.2
3.3

3.9
3.7

Data for the 524 former minefields can be aggregated on a provincial basis, and a
further aggregation of provinces into two stylised case studies has been made on the basis of
variations in traffic volume. Case Study IX comprises three provinces within or around the
largest towns in Afghanistan, the capital Kabul and Kandahar. Road traffic is heavy in these
localities – over 600 vehicles per day. On the other hand, saved km of road per km cleared is
less than the average. Traffic can move somewhat faster by 15 km per hour, presumably due
to better roads. There are comparatively few passengers in each vehicle, and travel cost is
less than the average, which indicates a larger share of short-distance journeys. Case Study
X, comprising all other provinces, shows the opposite characteristics. There is much less
traffic on the roads, an average of only 32 vehicles per day. A higher road transport distance
is saved per km cleared, however, and each vehicle carries many passengers. These
characteristics distinguish Case Study X from the more urban areas represented by Case
Study IX.
The information in Table 9.3 has been collected after the areas have been cleared of
mines. In order to calculate the benefits for road traffic from mine clearance, information is
also needed about the before situation, in particular the level of road traffic in a situation
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when a longer and more time-demanding and costly distance had to be travelled. It will be
assumed that road transport demand in Afghanistan is relatively inelastic, with an elasticity
of 0.5. A 10% travel cost decrease would lead to an increase in road traffic of 5%. This may
be the situation when traffic to a large degree consists of work and other essential journeys.
The length of road used for analysis is 50 km, corresponding to 1 km2 of mined land
when the road is 20 m wide. The purpose is to convert all costs calculated into costs per km2
of mined areas.
It is necessary to assume that the road distance travelled after clearance consists of the
cleared road only, which may be wrong. Other stretches of not previously mined roads could
be included, but we have no information about this. Moreover, as noted earlier, the
information on saved road lengths in the database may contain inaccuracies. The material
consists of many entries with 0 km saved (which could mean no information available rather
than zero survey) and a smaller number of entries with large savings.
Employed persons are assumed to earn 1 US$ a day, which constitutes the basis for
valuing their travel time. Unemployed and non-active persons may also value prolonged
travel time negatively, so one-quarter of the cost for an employed person will be adopted as
an estimate. Unemployment is assumed to be 50% of persons in the active age group 20-65
years. This age group constitutes 44% of the total population.
By applying these assumptions, it is calculated that travel costs on previously mined
roads have decreased by 30% in the mainly urban areas included in Case Study IX, and by
60% in the areas of Case Study X. This would have caused increases in road traffic of 15%
and 30% respectively, with the assumed elasticity of 0.5.
Traffic after clearance is set at 450 and 25 vehicles per day, respectively, for the two
case studies. Some of the counted traffic may be strictly local and very short distance, in
which the cleared road link does not necessarily play an important part.
Table 9.4: Travel Cost per Passenger and Traffics on Links of Road,
Before and After Mine Clearance
Case Study IX
30 %
0.5
15 %
383
450

Travel cost decrease %
Elasticity
Traffic increase
Traffic before clearance, vehicles per day
Traffic after clearance vehicles per day

Case Study X
60 %
0.5
30 %
21
25

The benefits from clearing mined roads are calculated as cost savings for passengers
now travelling with vehicles on the safe road link as compared to the longer alternative route,
which had to be used before clearance. The savings will comprise reduced direct travel costs
or fares paid by passengers, which are assumed to fully cover the vehicle operating costs. In
addition, the reduction in passengers’ travel time has been evaluated, as explained above.
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The passengers and vehicles that used to travel the longer alternative road link before
clearance will draw full benefits from time and cost savings. In addition, some new traffic
will be generated as a direct consequence of the drop in travel cost and time after reopening
of the shorter road link. The benefits for this new traffic can be roughly estimated at half the
amount of savings in travel cost and time.
The justification for this estimate is that all new travellers in theory could be ranked
by their willingness-to-pay for trips they undertake. It would then be found that some of the
new travellers are barely willing to pay even the new, reduced costs or take on the reduced
travel time, while others would almost be willing to pay the cost and spend the travel time
necessary for the longer journey before clearance. A good estimate of average willingness to
pay for all new travellers together would thus be half way between the new and the previous
costs. Their willingness to pay minus what they actually have to pay for the journey then
constitutes the benefits for these new travellers. Benefits for new traffic thus amount to the
number of new travellers multiplied by half the value of time and cost savings.
As would be expected, the benefits from clearance of mined roads are large, over US$
250,000 per year both for urban areas (Case Study IX) and more rural regions (Case Study
X). Different characteristics between the two case studies are largely offsetting in terms of
the benefit calculations, so the total savings appear to be of much the same order. The lower
traffic on rural roads is compensated for by the larger road transport distance saved per km
cleared and the larger number of passengers carried by each vehicle as compared to the
corresponding figures in the more urban areas. The annual benefits and the total benefits
discounted over 15 years with a 10% discount rate (Table 9.5) form benefit components to be
compared with the costs of mine clearance in road areas.
Table 9.5: Benefits from Clearance of Mined Roads, 1000 US$ Annually and
Discounted at 10% Rate over 15 Years (for 50 km Roads=1 km2)
Case Study IX
Existing traffic, savings US$/year
- Travel cost
- Travel time valued
New traffic, savings US$/year
- Travel cost
- Travel time valued
Annual benefits all passengers US$ 1000
Total benefits over 15 years, US$ 1000
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Case Study X

237
29

215
25

21
3

19
2

290
2 207

261
1 983

10. Mines in Residential Areas
It has been estimated that access to 87,500 houses has been blocked by landmines,
constituting a major obstacle to the return of refugees and internally displaced persons to
their villages. A rapid assessment in six districts of Afghanistan in October 2000 showed that
close to 40% of all houses had been destroyed by war activities, and only some 30%
remained undamaged. The traditional Afghan homestead, the qala, is used for residential
purposes and for storing of agricultural products. Parts of it can also be used for keeping
animals.
Estimating the average area of an Afghan family homestead (a Qala) at 500 m2,
means that access to about 55,400 houses has been cleared of mines during the period 19902000 (Table 10.1). According to MAPA’s assessment1, 27,400 high-priority residential units
still remain to be cleared as of the year 2000. Another 250 mined residences were identified
and given lower priority.
Table 10.1: Residential Areas Blocked by Mines
Year
Cleared land km2.
Houses cleared
Remaining by 2000
– high priority
– other houses

1990-2000
1999 1998 1997 1996
1995
27.7
3.1
3.4
2.8
2.7
4.9
55400 6200 6800 5600 5400 98000

1994
2.9
5800

27400
250

The structures cleared of mines under MAPA include private homes as well as public
facilities such as schools, health clinics, hospitals, and government and administration
offices.
Information on property prices was collected from different locations in Afghanistan
during fieldwork in October 2000. The material is far from complete, and it shows some
variation in prices, which would be expected. Kabul comes out as the most expensive area,
with other eastern provinces somewhat below. Logar, a rural area to the south of Kabul, has
the lowest property prices among the areas where information was gathered.
It was found during the fieldwork that a number of cleared housing areas were only
partially in use or had not been reclaimed at all. The explanation given was often that the
owner could not afford to meet the cost of reconstruction. In some cases the owner still lived
as a refugee abroad. These observations suggest a need for more comprehensive information
collection before priority is given to clearance of residential areas, as clearance techniques
for standing or collapsed building structures tend to be expensive (see Section 11). More
information on prices and rents for property also is needed. A presumably conservative
estimate of benefits from clearance of residential areas is derived in the meantime.

1

Source: MAPA Survey Database.
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This limited material available provides the basis for two case studies on property
values. Case Study XI includes provinces with the major towns of Afghanistan, where
property values are assumed to be high, while Case Study XII comprises the remaining
provinces of the country. The estimates in Table 10.2 are intended to reflect land values for
high-priority residential areas for mine clearance by MAPA.
Table 10.2: Property Land Values in Afghanistan,
US$ per m2 or US$ million per km2
Case Study XI
Case Study XII

Province
Kabul, Kandahar
Provinces except XI
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US$/m2
5
2

11.

Clearance Operations and Costs

The estimation of the costs of de-mining activities raises issues that are rather
different from the issues that arose in the calculation of socio-economic benefits, as discussed
in Sections 6-10. In principle the data problems are much more manageable, since the costs
are incurred by the mine action NGOs, and extensive data on costs is compiled by MACA.
However, there is some degree of incompleteness in the cost data, mainly relating to (1) the
direct funding of some NGOs by donors outside of the UNOCHA Afghanistan Emergency
Trust Fund, not all of the information on which is pulled together by MACA, and (2) in-kind
contributions (e.g. vehicles, machinery, etc.) and their valuation. Overhead costs also need to
be included. And finally, costs need to be allocated across different categories of land
cleared and different types of de-mining techniques.
11.1

Program Financing and Cost Information

MAPA is financed from two main sources. Most funding from donors is channelled
through the UNOCHA Afghan Emergency Trust Fund (AETF), which then distributes the
funds by activities and to different NGOs. A much smaller but significant amount of funds is
passed from donors directly to individual NGOs, which avoids paying the fixed 13% charge
designed to cover UNOCHA overhead costs.
The amount of funds passed on directly to some NGOs is still only partially known to
MAPA. It is, however, possible to separate out the clearance tasks undertaken with
UNOCHA/AETF funds. For 1999 this appears to be 85% of the total mined areas cleared
under MAPA and 54% of the former battlefield areas.
Some contributions, both through and outside the AETF, are made by donors in kind,
including equipment, technical assistance, training, etc. The real value to the mine action
program of these contributions can be difficult to assess. Most of them are purchased in highcost countries at elevated prices, while MAPA in an untied situation could probably have
found more economical options.
The information on MAPA funding as it appears in its Annual Reports therefore
needs to be corrected in order to estimate the actual costs of the program. This study relies
mainly on information about other financing supplied to MACA by the NGOs, which may
nevertheless be incomplete.
For the NGOs engaged in mine clearance, it is clear which parts of their activities are
financed through the AETF. On that basis a split of activities has been made in order to
correct the estimates of unit costs, like cost per clearance team hour and cost per km2 cleared.
A number of factors are considered important for the cost of mine clearance. The
following information can be obtained from the MAPA Minefield Database:
• Size of area to be cleared.
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•
•
•
•
•

Minefield or former battlefields.
Types of mined area: agricultural, residential, road, irrigation system, grazing land
(former battlefields are not classified as to type of area).
Surface of soil in area.
Clearing techniques applied: manual teams, mine dog teams, mechanical teams (currently
back-hoe), community-based clearance.
Number of mines and UXO detected (known only after clearance is completed).

Minefields and former battlefields are cleared by teams using various techniques. The
mechanical option consists of back-hoes, but other machines have been applied previously
and new ones are about to be tried. Each technique implies a different composition of the
clearance team in terms of manpower and equipment. One of the NGOs, AREA, is engaged
in community based mine clearance as a pilot project.
Cost data for 1999, the latest available at the time of this study, have been used. The
main source of information is the MAPA Annual Report, which presents information both on
funding through the AETF and distribution of funds by agency (NGO) and activity.
Corresponding information is also presented in the Annual Report for 1998, while earlier
annual reports from MAPA contain less detailed information on costs. For detailed cost
information on earlier years, MACA archives and the individual NGOs will have to be
consulted.
Statistics on areas cleared in km2 for different types of mined land also are presented
in the Annual Report, the source of these data being the MAPA Minefields Database.
Information on clearance team hours has been found most useful for the unit cost
calculations. The NGOs register the number of hours spent by each of their teams (manual,
mechanical, dogs) on individual clearance tasks. This information is entered into the MAPA
Minefields Database. For the most recent years such data are complete, whereas not all
NGOs supplied satisfactory data for earlier years.
11.2

Productivity of Operations

Information on area in m2 and clearance time in team hours for each individual
minefield and battlefield is available in the MAPA Minefield Database. The area in m2
cleared per team hour provides an indication of clearance productivity. (For the year 2000
the months from January to July are included.)
From Table 11.1 it appears that the area of minefields cleared per team hour of work
has decreased over time, from 464 m2 in 1994 to 267 m2 in 1999. One explanation for this
could be that the tasks are getting more difficult as the easier areas were cleared first.
Another possibility is that improvements in safety have been achieved at some cost in terms
of speed of clearance operations. Generally it is much more time-consuming to clear
minefields than former battlefields. On average during the period 1993-2000, about 20 times
more battlefields than minefields were cleared per team hour of work.
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Table 11.1: Clearance Productivity in m2 Cleared per Team Hour
All areas and techniques
Minefield m2/team hour
Battlefield m2/team hour
Battle-/minefield ratio

1993-2000
314
6168
20

1999
267
6307
24

1998
299
4355
15

1997
297
6154
21

1996
337
6564
20

1995
413
5585
14

1994
464
20284
44

Minefields are classified by land types when the areas are surveyed. Distinctive
variations appear in clearance efficiency for various types of areas, as can be seen from Table
11.2. Agricultural land comes close to the average in m2 cleared per team hour for the period
1993-2000 in total (last column in Table 11.2). Grazing areas are normally much less timeconsuming to clear, and this has also been the case with roads most of the time. Residential
areas are far more time consuming to clear than the average. Clearance tasks on grazing land
and in residential areas have both experienced significant drops in output per team hour over
time.
Table 11.2: Clearance Productivity for Different Land Types,
m2 Cleared per Team Hour
All techniques
Land type:
Agricultural land
Grazing area
Residential areas
Roads
Irrigation system
Average mined area

1993-2000
343
519
123
470
258
314

1999
299
361
93
532
295
267

1998
392
491
71
759
262
299

1997
368
604
67
486
174
297

1996
354
478
146
741
139
337

1995
351
720
285
457
192
413

1994
481
989
243
292
492
464

1993-2000
Average=1
1.1
1.7
0.4
1.5
0.8
1.0

Turning to the productivity of different types of de-mining techniques, manual teams
work on all types of land. Dog teams, which also include de-miners to extract the mines,
started operations in 1994. Mechanical back-hoe techniques are used in particular where
layers of rubble, ruins of houses, or heavy earth cover the mines, making manual excavation
dangerous or impossible.
One important conclusion that can be drawn from Table 11.3 is that clearing
minefields by means of dogs on average has been 3.5 times as efficient as manual teams in
terms of m2 cleared per team hour. Dogs are actually more efficient in all types of areas than
both manual and back-hoe techniques. Nevertheless, specialized teams may be needed on
certain types of land. Dogs can be used on open land with free visibility where trees or
bushes do not hamper operations. The back-hoe is the least efficient method and is used
exclusively when other techniques are dangerous or impossible. Flail has proved efficient on
certain types of areas, but technical difficulties have been experienced. In certain areas, use
of dogs faces seasonal restrictions because of sandstorms. For former battlefields, manual
techniques are used almost exclusively.
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Table 11.3: Productivity for Clearance Techniques on Land Types,
Ratios Between m2 Cleared per Team Hour
Average for Manual Clearance of Mined Area is Here Set Equal to 1
Period 1990-2000
Land type:
Agricultural land
Grazing area
Residential areas
Roads
Irrigation system
Average mined area
Battlefield

Manual

Dogs

Backhoe

Flail

1.0
2.0
0.5
0.8
1.0
1.0
27

4.0
4.0
2.7
2.9
3.4
3.5
58

0.1
0.1
0.1
0.2
0.4
0.1

1.8
3.8
3.3
0.3
1.4

The efficiency of mine clearing operations has changed over time. Therefore, the
average for recent years including 1998, 1999 and January-July 2000 of m2 cleared per team
hour will be used for the cost calculations (see Table 11.4). Three techniques will be costed,
manual teams, dog teams, and backhoe. Flail has been little used in recent years.
Table 11.4: Areas Cleared in m2 per Team Hour,
Average for the Period 1998-2000.
Land type:
Agricultural land
Grazing area
Residential areas
Roads
Irrigation system
All mined areas
Battlefield

Manual
156
330
60
129
204
169
6036

Dogs
Backhoe
918
68
802
30
637
23
691
53
785
79
817
39

In Table 11.4 the area cleared in m2 per team hour is shown for all techniques. In
practice, as mentioned above, there are technical and economic restraints on the use of
different techniques. Mined areas cleared in the period 1998-1999 and until the end of July
2000, distributed in percentage terms by techniques and types of land, are shown in Table
11.5.
Table 11.5: Mined Areas Cleared in the Period 1998-2000,
Distributed in Percentage on Techniques and Types of Land
Land type %:
Agricultural land
Grazing area
Residential areas
Roads
Irrigation system
All mined areas

Manual %
18.4
23.9
5.5
0.3
1.4
50

Dogs %
Backhoe % All techniques %
27.1
0.27
46
7.4
0.08
31
3.4
0.24
9
10.0
0.00
10
1.5
0.20
3
49
1,1
100

Manual teams (50%) and dogs (49%) have become the main techniques used in mine
clearance activities conducted by MAPA. Clearance of roads is almost exclusively carried
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out by dogs, and this has also become the most frequently used technique on agricultural
land. Manual clearance is still the main method used for grazing areas, and close to 100% of
all former battlefields (not included in the table) are cleared manually.
The back-hoe is applied on a small scale for specific tasks in residential areas, for
irrigation systems, and on agricultural land. It has only incidentally (1998-2000) been used
for clearing other land types. Back-hoe teams are normally supported by manual teams, and
it is difficult, often impossible, to make a clear-cut separation between mechanical and
manual activities.
11.3

Clearance Costs

In Table 4.1, MAPA’s unit cost of mine clearance was derived by dividing the annual
cost of MAPA by the area of minefields cleared. For 1999, the costs calculated in this way
amounted to US$ 0.6 per m2 or US$ 600.000 per km2. This cost figure needs to be adjusted,
however, for several reasons:
• MAPA undertakes other activities in addition to mine clearance. Monitoring, evaluation,
training, and minefield surveys are preparation for and thus integral components of mine and
UXO clearance, so their inclusion in the total cost of mine clearance is well-justified. Mine
awareness and advocacy for a ban on the use of landmines are separate activities, however,
and their costs need to be excluded. Mine awareness is the most costly of these components.
MAPA has allocated about 7% of its total budget for mine awareness purposes in 2000.
Some NGOs are engaged in both mine clearance and mine awareness, but it is possible to
separate these activities in the MAPA funding data.
• Clearance activities comprise former battlefields in addition to minefields. In 1999,
about 75 km2 of former battlefields were cleared as against 34 km2 of minefields. Table
11.4 indicates that manual teams can clear more than 30 times as much former battlefield
area of UXO per hour than mine-infested land. This suggests that minefields are about
30 times as costly to clear (using manual techniques) as former battlefields (which are
almost invariably cleared manually).
• As discussed earlier in Section 11.1, the funds supplied directly to NGOs by donors need
to be added to the AETF financing. In cases where information about additional funding
is lacking, clearance tasks not funded through AETF should be deducted from the MAPA
activity list, so that costs and activities correspond. However, questions may be raised
whether contributions in kind are included fully and correctly.
• Investment expenditures need to be properly treated. The UNOCHA logistics and
procurement section provides support to the mine action NGOs, including procurement of
capital goods. Where non-expendable equipment is supplied, such as vehicles,
communications equipment, and the like, costs should not be attributed to the year of
supply only but rather treated as investments, subject to depreciation over a number of
years depending on the normal useful lifetime of the item. Depreciation charges against
investments undertaken in earlier years also should be included as expenses for 1999.
The cost calculations in this study are based on the table “AETF expenditure
breakdown by agency and activity” from the MAPA Annual Report for 1999. This table
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gives expenditure for each agency. The agencies involved in mine clearance activities in that
year were the following:
• ATC (manual and mechanical teams).
• AREA (manual, community based).
• DAFA (manual and mechanical teams).
• OMAR (manual and mechanical teams).
• MDC (dogs)
• HALO (manual and mechanical teams, survey).
• MCPA (survey, some manual clearance).
• META (training and monitoring).
• DDG (this agency started operations on a small scale in year 2000).
Only a few of these NGOs are, however, competing for the same types of tasks, so
the potential benefits of competition may not be realized to any great extent.
AREA is engaged in a pilot community-based mine clearance program. Utilizing the
local communities’ human resources and know-how, the program enables ex-resistance
fighters and other villagers to participate in mine clearance activities. The community-based
mine clearance program is unique in the world. It is low cost, and payment to village deminers is in the form of food-for-work or a nominal salary. There are few logistical costs, as
the de-miners do not work outside their villages and can return to their homes at night.
Technical and safety issues are potential problems, but no incidents were reported in 1999.
The project has been assigned to work in low-priority areas only, on fields not containing
anti-tank or minimum metal mines. The program started in 1997 and is still being operated
on a small scale, clearing less than 0.5 km2 of minefields annually (0.38 km2 in 1999).
In 1999 OMAR cleared 3.48 km2 of minefields. This NGO did not receive funding
from UNOCHA/AETF for mine clearance, only for mine awareness. Information is,
however, available on direct funding of OMAR from other sources, i.e. the European
Commission, Netherlands Organization for International Development and Cooperation
(NOVIB) and Germany. OMAR is using de-miners from local villages, so extra subsistence
costs for out-of-station work are avoided.
HALO is engaged in surveying as well as mine and battlefield clearance. In 1999 this
agency cleared 3.6 km2 of minefields and 51.6 km2 of former battlefields. HALO is working
in the districts of Kabul, Baghlan, and Wardak on designated areas where they do both
survey and clearance operations. HALO is self-sufficient in terms of training, and also does
not pay a subsistence allowance since recruitment of people is from the area in which
operations are ongoing. HALO (and DDG) apply working procedures which are to some
extent different from those of MAPA.
In 1999 HALO received funding from the USA through UNOCHA/AETF for
clearance and survey activities in Wardak Province, which is included in the MAPA Annual
Report for 1999. With these funds HALO cleared 1.7 km2 of minefields and 17.2 km2 of
former battlefields. The amount of funds HALO receives directly from donors for its other
clearance activities is not known.
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MDC uses mine dog teams exclusively. Since no other NGO is working with dogs,
MDC costs give a complete picture of mine dog clearance costs in Afghanistan. MDC is also
assisting MCPA on survey tasks with mine dog sets. The costs of operating these mine dog
sets (about US$ 905,000 in 1999) have therefore been deducted from MDC’s clearance
activities and added to MCPA survey activities. Since the start of its activities in 1994, MDC
has received support from the German government, some of it in kind.
MCPA’s principal activity is the survey of minefields and former battlefields. Some
mine clearance also is undertaken, mainly as part of survey activities. In 1999, 0.3 km2 of
minefields and another 0.3 km2 of former battlefields were cleared by MCPA.
For the purposes of this study, all MCPA activities are regarded as integral to the
mine and battlefield clearance activities of MAPA. MCPA survey costs have thus been
added to the clearance costs of other agencies on a per km2 basis. An exception is made for
HALO, which is undertaking its own surveys.
META is in charge of training and surveying for the other mine action NGOs. The
budget of this organization is added to the costs of the clearance and surveying agencies on a
per team hour basis, except in the case of HALO which conducts its own training.
For each of the agencies listed above, the UNOCHA AETF funding has been
increased by 13%, corresponding to the fixed UNOCHA overhead rate, to cover
administration at MACA and other overhead costs. (All UNOCHA funding, including funds
for activities other than mine action, carries an overhead charge of 13% to cover general
overhead costs associated with operating in Afghanistan.) Direct/in kind contributions are
assigned to the NGOs on the basis of team hours of work performed.
A tentative correction for depreciation is undertaken by assuming that the equipment
supplied in 1999 (as per the Annual Report) will be depreciated over five years. An addition
for equipment supplied in earlier years also has been made. ATC received a large supply of
equipment in 1999 compared to the agency’s total budget. Lacking more precise
information, it is assumed that this new equipment replaced 50% of ATC’s total capital
stock. Other agencies received much smaller amounts of equipment, which are assumed to
constitute 10% of their total capital stock. This estimate of depreciation is only preliminary,
and the depreciation calculations should be revised when better information becomes
available.
Table 11.6 shows the estimated cost of clearance in US$ per team hour resulting from
the assumptions made above. Team hours are the best available basis for distribution of costs,
better than per km2 cleared, since productivity in terms of area cleared varies considerably
with type of area, technique, and over time. Team hours are assumed to vary principally with
clearance technique employed.
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Table 11.6: Clearance Cost in US$ per Team Hour, Agencies 1999

Cost per Team Hour

ManualManual/
ManualManualMechanical community mechanical mechanical
ATC
AREA
DAFA
OMAR
188
60
208
205

Dogs

Manualmechanical
MDC
HALO
157
96

MDC is quite efficient in terms of cost per team hour worked. Moreover, mine dog
clearance is more effective in m2 cleared per team hour than all other techniques (see Table
11.4). It can therefore be stated that mine dog teams should be the first choice for all tasks
where this technique is technically feasible.
ATC, DAFA, and OMAR come out with comparatively similar costs per team hour,
in the range of US$ 188-208. All three agencies operate with both manual and mechanical
teams.
At DAFA and OMAR, the mechanical teams (using back-hoes) work in an integrated
way with manual teams. Therefore, their operations cannot easily be subdivided between
these two techniques. In ATC, manual and mechanical clearance methods can be separated,
since these operations are carried out by different teams. Efforts to calculate the costs of
different clearance techniques will therefore be pursued using the cost data for this agency.
HALO’s operations seem to be very cost efficient, and their figures even include the
cost of surveying, which have to be added for the other agencies (calculated on a per km2
basis). HALO’s costs of US$ 96 per team hour are extraordinarily low, taking into account
the fact that they are operating in a similar manner to ATC, DAFA, and OMAR. It is
therefore appropriate to ask to what extent all of HALO’s costs, for instance overheads, are
included for the clearance tasks undertaken with UNOCHA/AETF funds.
The community-based approach seems cost efficient, but it is still rather early to draw
very strong conclusions about it, since AREA is operating a pilot project on a very much
smaller scale than the others.
As mentioned earlier, there is a need to separate manual and mechanical clearance
costs. This has been achieved by means of detailed analysis of the costs of ATC, where such
a split is feasible. It was found that manual methods in general are 1.5 times more expensive
per team hour than mechanical methods (Table 11.7). Personnel costs are twice as high for
manual teams, while capital and maintenance costs are not a great deal lower, in spite of the
expensive back-hoe machine used by the mechanical team (cost US$ 134,000).
It seems that the actual cost of mine clearance by manual and mechanical teams can
explain 56% of ATC’s cost level, UNOCHA overhead costs and META services form
another 15%. The remaining 29% can be considered agency overhead (see Annex 2 for
detailed calculations of clearance costs).
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Table 11.7: Manual versus Mechanical Clearance Methods,
Cost Ratio per Team Hour
Ratio Manual/Mechanical
2.1
0.8
0.6
1.5

Personnel cost
Capital cost
Maintenance cost
Total Manual/Mechanical

By assuming that manual clearance is generally 1.5 times more expensive than
mechanical clearance for all NGOs, costs can be distributed between these two clearance
techniques.
11.4

Cost of Mine Accidents to De-miners

Mine action also takes its toll in the form of accidents during clearance operations.
The number of de-miners killed and injured in service for MAPA has decreased during the
last two years compared to the mid-1990s. As Figure 11.1 shows, four de-miners were killed
during operations in 1999 and 21 injured.
Figure 11.1: Accidents during Mine Clearance,
Injuries and Deaths (1990-1999)
120
Injuries
Deaths

100
80
60

94

40
20
0

68
21
4

69

82

72

63

33
2

16
4

8

2

7

7

9

10

18
2

1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 1994 1993 1992 1991 1990

De-mining accidents represent a loss to the victims and to society, which can be
evaluated in socio-economic terms by applying the same methods as for mine accidents in
general, described in Section 5 of this report. A de-miner presumably belongs to the age
group 18-40 years, he experiences no unemployment, and in case of accident his medical
costs will be fully covered (averaging US$ 4,000). Injuries to de-miners are assumed to be
distributed over categories of casualties in the same way as for mine accident victims.
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Based on these assumptions, the socio-economic loss for a typical injury to a deminer is estimated at about US$ 12,500 and that of a fatal casuality at US$ 16,000 (Table
11.8). MAPA accident rates for 1999 – 4 deaths and 21 injuries to de-miners – will be
applied as described below, and the cost of these accidents will be added to the de-mining
costs.
Table 11.8: Economic Loss From De-mining Accidents, US$.
Loss with injuries
Loss with fatal casualties
Total loss

Cost per incident
US$
12 552
16 210

Incidents
1999

Loss in US$ per
Team Hour
21
3.6
4
0.9
4.5

The risk of accidents for de-miners is highest in the case of manual clearance. It is
consequently assumed that accident costs will vary with the input of manual team-hours. For
1999 they are estimated to constitute an additional cost of US$ 4.5 per team hour for the
manual clearance technique.
11.5

Total Unit Costs of Mine Clearance

Costs per team hour can now be combined with data on team hours needed to clear
different types of mined areas from Table 11.4 to derive the unit costs for clearing different
types of land using different de-mining techniques. The results are shown in Table 11.9.
Table 11.9: Clearance Costs in US$ per m2 or US$ Million per km2 on Land Types
Land type:
Agricultural land
Grazing area
Residential areas
Roads
Irrigation system
All mined areas
Former battlefields

Manual

Dogs

1.3
0.7
3.4
1.6
1.0
1.2
0.04

0.2
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.3

Mechanical
Community
2.0
4.4
0.3
5.7
2.6
1.7
3.4

Clearance using mine-detection dogs is by a large margin the most cost-efficient
method for all types of areas, and hence this technique should be used wherever feasible.
Mechanical clearance is the most expensive and is generally called for only when other
techniques are too dangerous, in particular for collapsed buildings. Manual clearance is
reasonably cost-efficient on grazing areas, and it is in practice the only technique used for
former battlefields.
Mine clearance by dog teams is keeping MAPA’s costs down. Use of dogs is cost
effective and also efficient in clearance time per km2. A large proportion of MAPA’s tasks
are now cleared by dogs, and without this method a much higher level of costs would have
been experienced. Dogs cannot be used in all conditions and for all types of areas. However,
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currently the constraint is not the amount of clearance tasks or types of land suitable for dogs;
it is rather the number of dogs and the training capacity of MDC.
Since the community-based approach remains a pilot project, it is difficult to draw too
many conclusions. Still, costs with this method appear to be remarkably low.
Relatively large cost variations have been found between some of the clearance
agencies. There is thus a need to look further into the strengths, limitations, and cost
structures of the different techniques and the approach and operational routines of the
individual NGOs involved. AREA’s community-based approach would be of special interest,
but also HALO’s achievements should be monitored more closely and compared to the more
standard MAPA set up, represented by ATC, DAFA, and OMAR. DDC should also be
included in the analysis, once it becomes fully operational. HALO’s seemingly low-cost
approach did not influence the calculations, since no split between manual and mechanical
operations was possible for HALO.
Of the 13 NGOs participating in the MAPA program in 1999, only four ─ ATC,
DAFA, OMAR, and HALO ─ were engaged in similar types of activities in mine clearance.
Of these, OMAR was totally and HALO partially financed directly from donors. In addition,
HALO was loosely integrated in the MAPA program.
Based on these observations, it seems that the mine action NGOs may have managed
to reserve secluded areas of activity for themselves. The apparent significant cost differences
across some of the de-mining NGOs suggests that there is scope for improving costeffectiveness. More direct competition between clearance agencies would improve the costefficiency of the mine action program. In order to achieve this, the currently rather restricted
access to the MAPA program would need to be opened up, with tasks which are now to a
large extent assigned on a command basis being put out on some kind of competitive tender
to technically qualified agencies. Introduction of competition, however, will take time and
needs to be carefully phased.
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12. Evaluation of Mine Clearance in Cost-Benefit Terms
It is now possible to pull together all of the calculations of socio-economic benefits
and costs made earlier in this paper and conduct a socio-economic cost-benefit analysis of
de-mining.
12.1

Methodology

Although substantial resources that have been devoted to mine action in Afghanistan
by the assistance community (a total of some $150 million during 1991-1999), a careful
evaluation of the socio-economic benefits and costs of this program was not conducted prior
to this study. This reflects in part past conceptual approaches to mine action: (1) the
“military” approach (i.e. clearing bottlenecks to movements of people and vehicles – echoed
in the more recent emphasis on removing “blockages” to communities) and (2) the
humanitarian approach (saving lives). But mine action is also (3) a development activity,
since it allows those saved from becoming victims of mine accidents to live out economically
productive and personally rewarding lives and also brings mine-contaminated land back into
productive use. Moreover, whether it is considered a humanitarian or development activity,
the mine action program must in any case compete with other worthy humanitarian and
development-oriented programs for limited resources available from the assistance
community. This study takes a comprehensive approach to the evaluation of de-mining,
encompassing the “military”, humanitarian, and development perspectives. In this light, the
cost-benefit analysis of mine clearance activities in Afghanistan aims to include all relevant
benefit and cost components to the extent that available information permits them to be
quantified and evaluated in comparable terms.
Conceptually, the socio-economic costs of landmines can be divided into three broad
categories: (1) loss of life, health, human production potential, and human welfare resulting
from mine accidents; (2) denial of access to mine-infested land and loss of associated
production or consumption benefits from the land concerned; and (3) distortion of behavior
due to the existence of mines with consequent socio-economic losses resulting from longer
travel distances, journeys not undertaken due to greater distance and difficulty, and other
distortions in behavior.
In line with the above categorization of the costs of landmines, the specific socioeconomic benefits of mine clearance that this study focuses on are (1) the gains in economic
productivity due to reduced human losses from mine accidents; (2) the corresponding savings
in medical costs; (3) the improvement in human welfare attributable to reduced human losses
from mine accidents; (4) the net economic benefits attributable to returning reclaimed land to
productive use; and (5) reduced losses of livestock from mine accidents (on those types of
land used by livestock).
The following components evaluated in Sections 5-11 form the building blocks for
the cost-benefit analysis:
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•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Reductions in human losses due to mine accidents (Tables 5.7 and 5.8 in particular).
Productive output from cleared agricultural land (Table 6.13).
Productive output from areas that have benefited from clearance of irrigation systems
(Table 7.3).
Benefits from cleared grazing areas (Table 8.6).
Reductions in livestock lost in mine accidents (Table 8.9).
Reduced transport costs and travel time resulting from renewed access to de-mined roads
(Table 9.5).
Benefits from mine clearance in residential areas (Table 10.2).
Regional variations in benefit components have been captured in the Case Studies I-XII.
Full cost of mine clearance per m2 on various types of land and with techniques currently
in use (Table 11.9).
The main evaluation criterion applied in this study will be the Benefit-Cost Ratio

(BCR).
Benefit-Cost Ratio: Benefit – Cost
Cost
Benefits minus costs or net benefits will be the relevant socio-economic criteria.
Dividing by costs is done to derive the BCR and facilitates comparison of projects or
clearance tasks of different sizes.
The higher the BCR the more well-justified is the project. A negative ratio indicates
that this clearance activity cannot be justified on the basis of the socio-economic benefits
incorporated in the analysis alone. Different projects or clearance tasks can be ranked by
their BCRs, and if resources are limited there will be a cut-off point for the BCR, below
which the project/task concerned should not be implemented.
The break-even point is when the Benefit-Cost Ratio is 0. Then benefits will be equal
to costs for the given discount rate, which is set at 10% in this study. A clearance task with a
BCR of zero thus produces just enough benefits to meet its costs at a discount rate of 10%.
Lowering the discount rate would increase the BCR of a project, by assigning more
importance to future benefits. The discount rate will depend on the general level of interest
rates in a country net of the inflation rate, as well as on other factors.
A high discount rate means that few projects will come out with a satisfactory BCR.
Nevertheless, it is generally wrong to think that projects in the developing world should be
subject to a low discount rate. Capital is scarce, and competition for funds should be high
among a large number of competing uses.
There is evidence of prevailing high rates of interest in Afghanistan. Farmers have to
accept significantly lower prices for their crops if they wish to receive payment 5-6 months
in advance. Farm gate prices during the harvest season may be as much as 40-50% higher
than what farmers actually get during the planting season. Such deals imply a substantial rate
of interest, even when the prevailing inflation is taken into account.
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An alternative evaluation criterion used in this study to assess the overall socioeconomic returns to MAPA’s mine clearance operations will be the Internal Rate of Return
(IRR). The IRR constitutes a more intuitive measure of gain, by presenting a percentage rate
of return on costs, much like the rate of interest on bank deposits.
Generally the IRR is defined as the discount rate which makes the value of discounted
future benefits equal to costs. The IRR can be compared for example to the prevailing rate of
interest net of inflation in a country. In this study a discount rate of 10% is being used, and
the minimum or break-even IRR should consequently be on the order of 10%. This will
normally correspond to a BCR of zero as defined above.
The time-horizon for benefits and costs in this study is set at 15 years. After that time
benefits are considered too uncertain to be reckoned with. Benefits are discounted over 15
years, while all clearance costs are assumed to be incurred in the first year.
Clearance of mined areas is considered indispensable for increasing food production
in Afghanistan and for the repatriation of refugees to the country. MAPA is giving first
priority only to areas that will be reclaimed for use immediately (see Section 4). It has
therefore been assumed in general that all cleared areas are put into use and that benefits start
to accrue immediately after clearance. It was found (see Section 10), however, that some
residential areas for various reasons have been only partially or not at all reclaimed for use a
long time after being cleared of mines. Few other factors can cause the BCR or IRR to
decline as much as not fully realizing benefits in the initial years after costs have been
incurred. A first item on the agenda for socio-economic assessment of a particular clearance
task should therefore be to ascertain to what extent the area will be reclaimed for use
immediately.
The Case Studies introduced previously can now be developed into cost-benefit
analyses for a number of model clearance tasks considered typical for MAPA. More
specifically, for agriculture-related land use (agriculture, irrigation, and grazing of livestock)
the cost-benefit analysis is conducted for eight region-based case studies. There are two case
studies each for roads and residential land. In all of the case studies, the analysis is
conducted for three different types of de-mining technique (manual, mine-detection dogs,
and mechanical). BCRs provide the basis for ranking of the individual tasks.
12.2

Cost-Benefit Analysis of the Case Studies

The main results of the cost-benefit analysis of clearance tasks on different types of
mined land using different types of de-mining techniques are shown in Table 12.1.
Clearance of irrigation systems provides very large returns generally and in particular for the
provinces in Case Studies III, IV, and V, in the Eastern and Southwestern parts of
Afghanistan. Irrigation systems in these provinces constitute the clearance tasks that most
convincingly can defend use of all kinds of techniques, including mechanical techniques
when that is the only feasible option. The provinces belonging under Case Study V in
particular, but also III and IV, provide very convincing returns for clearance of agricultural
land when dogs can be used. Clearance of roads yields solid returns, for rural areas (Case
Study X) not much less than for urban areas (Case Study IX).
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Use of mine detection dogs is overall the most cost-effective technique, with the
highest BCRs. No other technique provides a higher return for any case study; dogs should
consequently be used wherever this technique is applicable.
Mechanical clearance is costly for MAPA. There is scope, however, for applying this
technique when needed for irrigation systems in selected provinces, for agricultural land in
Case Study V areas mainly, and marginally for roads. Mechanical techniques are currently
applied for clearance of residential areas. Justification for this will have to be demonstrated
on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the value of the property and in particular the
risk that the property may remain unutilized after clearance. Limited data on benefits makes
it difficult to draw more definite conclusions with respect to residential property at this stage.
Clearance tasks for grazing areas face difficulties in justifying their costs. Negative
net socio-economic benefits may regularly be experienced when techniques other than
clearance using mine-detection dogs are applied. All regions show uniform low returns for
clearance of grazing land. However, clearance of grazing land is fully justified with use of
mine dog teams.
In terms of regions, the Northern Region (Case Study I), which to a large extent
represents low-productivity un-irrigated agriculture, provides the weakest justification for
clearance tasks on all types of lands. But clearance with use of dogs is nevertheless fully
justified.
Table 12.1: Benefit-Cost Ratios for Case Studies of Clearance Tasks
Region

Agriculture
Manual Dogs

Grazing

Mech.

Irrigation

Manual Dogs Mech.

Manual Dogs

Mech.

Case Study I

Northern Region all provinces

-0.5

1.9

-0.6

-0.5

0.2

-0.9

0.1

3.3

-0.3

Case Study II

Parwan, Kabul, Kapisa, Bamyan

-0.1

4.0

-0.4

-0.5

0.2

-0.9

1.7

8.9

0.6

Case Study III

Logar, Wardak

0.4

6.6

0.0

-0.5

0.2

-0.9

3.5

15.9

1.7

Case Study IV

Nangarhar, Laghman, Kunar

0.2

5.6

-0.2

-0.5

0.2

-0.9

2.8

13.3

1.3

Case Study V

Kandahar, Zabul, Oruzgan

1.4

11.6

0.6

-0.5

0.2

-0.9

7.2

29.5

3.9

Case Study VI

Ghazni, Paktika, Paktia

-0.3

2.9

-0.5

-0.5

0.2

-0.9

0.9

6.1

0.1

Case Study VII

Helmand

-0.2

3.4

-0.4

-0.5

0.2

-0.9

1.2

7.4

0.3

-0.2

3.3

-0.5

-0.5

0.2

-0.9

1.2

7.1

0.3

Case Study VIII Herat, Badghis, Farah, Nimroz

Case Study IX

Roads
Kandahar, Laghman, Kabul

Case Study X

Other provinces except Case IX

Case Study XI

Residential
Kabul, Kandahar

Case Study XII

Other provinces except Case XI

Manual Dogs

Mech.

1.0

9.2

0.2

0.8

8.5

0.1

0.8

17.2

0.0

-0.1

8.0

-0.5

The individual clearance tasks forming the background for Table 12.1 are listed in
Annex 3. The relative weights of the different benefit and cost components appear there, and
the tasks are listed in descending order of BCR. For cases with high BCRs, it is the
productive output from land that makes the difference. The human loss fluctuates less across
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the different Case Studies. However, clearance tasks on grazing areas may be justified in
many cases on account of avoided human loss alone.
It was intended that the selected Case Studies should as much as possible be
representative, so that conclusions on benefits and costs can be applied to a wide range of
similar tasks. The Case Studies conducted as part of this study, and the results from Table
12.1 in particular, should thus be able to provide guidance for particular clearance tasks at
different locations and for future years. However, the actual socio-economic returns of any
particular mine clearance activity will depend in large part on the characteristics and quality
of the specific land being cleared, the density and types of mines, the cost-efficiency of the
de-mining agency, and other factors affecting the difficulty of mine clearance.
12.3

Cost-Benefit Evaluation of the MAPA Program as a Whole

The data analysis carried out also permits a socio-economic cost-benefit evaluation of
the entire MAPA program. Calculations have been carried out for 1999, and the results are
shown in Table 12.2.
Table 12.2: Net Benefits of the MAPA Mine Clearance Program 1999, US$ Millions
Manual
Dogs
Mechanical
Total

Agriculture
3.4
14.4
0.0
17.7

Grazing
Irrigation Residential
-2.6
3.7
2.0
0.1
1.6
3.1
0.0
0.0
-0.1
-2.5
5.3
5.1

Roads
0.0
5.6
0.0
5.7

Total
6.5
24.9
-0.1
31.3

The net benefits of the MAPA mine clearance program for 1999 amount to over US$
31 million, resulting in a high BCR of 1.2. The largest portion of socio-economic benefits
results from clearing agricultural land using mine-detection dogs. Clearing agricultural land
and irrigation systems with manual methods and roads with dogs also make significant
contributions to total net benefits.
Use of manual techniques for clearance of grazing areas is more expensive than the
estimated socio-economic benefits can justify. Clearance of residential areas using
mechanical techniques also contributes negatively to the total net socio-economic benefits of
MAPA.
The internal rate of return (IRR) of the total MAPA mine clearance program for 1999
is estimated at 28%, which provides a very strong justification for the program. Clearing of
irrigation systems, roads, residential areas, and agricultural land with dogs, as well as
irrigation systems with manual techniques, show particularly large economic returns.
Clearance of grazing areas earns marginal returns, and positive IRRs for this type of land in
general are found only when dogs can be used.
The total costs of the MAPA program for 1999, not including mine-awareness
activities, are estimated at about US$ 28 million, somewhat higher than the US$ 22 million
figure in the Annual Report for 1999, which covers the AETF funded part of the program
only. On this basis, MAPA’s clearance costs for mined areas for 1999 are US$ 0.77 per m2.
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The unit cost of battlefield clearance is estimated at US$ 0.04 per m2, with a total cost for
1999 of US$ 2.6 million.
The reasons for the cost adjustments in the total cost figure are set forth in Section 11.
The fact that AETF funding only covers 85% of the mine clearance and 54% of battlefield
clearance costs accounts for much of the increase in costs (US$ 5 million). The socioeconomic costs of mine accidents to de-miners also have been added. On the other hand, the
estimated costs of mine clearance have been adjusted downwards by removing mine
awareness costs from the AETF budget.
Another factor contributing to the higher cost estimate is that the costs applied for
manual and mechanical techniques are based on data from ATC. In general, these deviate
somewhat from DAFA and OMAR on the low side but are substantially higher than HALO’s
costs, as can be seen in Table 11.6. In Wardak province at least, HALO is operating with
much lower costs those that are being used in the analysis of this study.
Finally, the unit costs calculated here all include the UNOCHA overhead of 13%.
Clearance tasks financed directly by donors avoid this cost, however. This was the case for
15% of the minefields cleared of mines and 46% of the former battlefield areas cleared of
UXO in 1999.
There is a need to look further into the cost structures of the different mine clearance
NGOs to explain such variations. The cost model used in this study may need to be corrected
on the basis of new findings. Given the conservative assumptions on which the current cost
estimates are based, corrections and refinements are likely to reduce the cost figures.
Based on the unit cost data calculated in this study, it is possible to roughly estimate
the cost of clearing the remaining identified and surveyed minefields in Afghanistan. The
average estimated unit cost of $0.77 per sq. m. should be reduced somewhat, however, to
take into account efficiency improvements that would result from scaling up and further
increasing the use of mine-detection dogs. Hence a figure of $0.60 (20% lower) is used for
the purpose of these illustrative calculations. On this basis, it is roughly estimated that
clearing the remaining minefields identified by MAPA as high-priority would cost about
$200 million, and that clearing other minefields would cost another $250-300 million,
depending on how many more previously undiscovered minefields are found. In a situation
where there is an end to conflict and large numbers of refugees and displaced persons return
to their homes, land use and movements of people will increase (with associated higher risks
of mine accidents), so it will make sense to expand the de-mining program and make faster
progress toward eliminating the problem of landmines for the bulk of the Afghan people.
12.4

Sensitivity Analysis

An alternative scenario, under which the welfare loss is excluded from the calculation
of the human loss from mine accidents, has been introduced in Section 5 (see Table 5.8).
This results in a decrease in benefits from reduced human loss in proportion to the accident
risk for different types of mined areas. The value of human loss associated with de-mining
accidents will be likewise reduced.
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Table 12.3: Benefit-Cost Ratios for Case Studies of Clearance Tasks
under Alternative Assumption
Region

Agriculture
Grazing
Manual Dogs Mech. Manual Dogs Mech.
Case Study I
Northern Region all provinces
-0.7
0.5
-0.8
-0.8
-0.4
-1.0
Case Study II
Parwan, Kabul, Kapisa, Bamyan
-0.3
2.5
-0.6
-0.8
-0.5
-1.0
Case Study III
Logar, Wardak
0.1
5.1
-0.2
-0.8
-0.5
-1.0
Case Study IV Nangarhar, Laghman, Kunar
0.0
4.1
-0.4
-0.8
-0.5
-1.0
Case Study V
Kandahar, Zabul, Oruzgan
1.1
10.2
0.4
-0.8
-0.5
-1.0
Case Study VI Ghazni, Paktika, Paktia
-0.5
1.5
-0.7
-0.8
-0.5
-1.0
Case Study VII Helmand
-0.4
1.9
-0.6
-0.8
-0.5
-1.0
Case Study VIII Herat, Badghis, Farah, Nimroz
-0.5
1.9
-0.6
-0.8
-0.5
-1.0
Roads
Manual Dogs Mech.
Case Study IX Kandahar, Laghman, Kabul
0.6
7.4
0.0
Case Study X
Other provinces except Case IX
0.5
6.7
-0.1
Residential
Case Study XI Kabul, Kandahar
0.6
15.5
-0.1
Case Study XII Other provinces except Case XI
-0.3
6.3
-0.6

Irrigation
Manual Dogs Mech.
-0.4
1.3
-0.6
1.1
7.0
0.3
3.0
14.0
1.4
2.3
11.3
1.0
6.6
27.5
3.6
0.4
4.1
-0.2
0.7
5.4
0.0
0.7
5.2
0.0

The main conclusions from Table 12.1 remain valid under this alternative scenario.
For the majority of the clearance tasks, the change has a somewhat marginal impact.
Socioeconomic returns remain high for clearance by dogs on agricultural land, irrigation
systems, and roads (see Table 12.3). Manual clearance becomes a somewhat less beneficial
option for irrigation systems, roads, and for a some of the agricultural case study areas. The
most conspicuous change is that the BCR for clearance of grazing areas becomes negative for
all techniques and in every case study region.
The alternative assumption would reduce net benefits from clearance under the
MAPA program in 1999 to US$ 20 million, and the overall benefit-cost ratio would decrease
to 0.8. Benefits from clearance of grazing areas generally fail to cover costs, while clearance
of other types of areas still contributes positively where dogs or manual methods are used.
Table 12.4: Net Benefits of MAPA Clearance Program 1999
under Alternative Assumptions, US$ Millions
Manual
Dogs
Mechanical
Total

Agriculture Grazing Irrigation Residential
0.8
-4.0
3.4
1.0
10.5
-0.3
1.3
2.5
0.0
-0.1
0.0
-0.1
11.3
-4.4
4.7
3.5

Roads
0.0
4.5
0.0
4.5

Total
1.2
18.5
-0.2
19.6

The alternative assumptions in the sensitivity analysis reduce the IRR of the MAPA
program from 28% to 21%, which is still a convincing rate of return. In general, the IRR
declines by a percentage related to the role reduced human loss plays among the benefits
from the clearance tasks.
A second sensitivity check also was discussed in Section 5. In addition to excluding
human welfare loss from the analysis, the estimated incidence of mine accidents (per km2)
could be reduced by half. These two important changes in assumptions together almost
certainly result in substantial underestimation of the human loss attributable to mine
accidents. However, this second alternative scenario is nevertheless useful for the purpose of
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coming up with a rock-bottom estimate of the socio-economic benefits and returns of mine
clearance in Afghanistan.
As can be seen from Table 12.5, the estimated net socio-economic benefits of the
MAPA mine clearance program fall to US$ 16 million under this scenario, for a BCR of 0.6.
The IRR also falls to 19%. These estimated returns are still quite respectable and
significantly above the cut-off points normally used in decisionmaking on public investment
projects and other public sector programs.
Table: 12.5 Net Benefits of MAPA Clearance Program 1999 under Alternative
Assumption with Reduced Mine Accident Rate, US$ Millions
Manual
Dogs
Mechanical
Total

Agriculture Grazing Irrigation Residential
-0.1
-4.5
3.3
0.7
9.3
-0.5
1.2
2.3
0.0
-0.1
0.0
-0.1
9.1
-5.0
4.5
2.9
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Roads
0.0
4.1
0.0
4.1

Total
-0.5
16.4
-0.2
15.7

13. Economic Evaluation of Other
Mine Action Program Activities
13.1

Introduction

In addition to survey and clearance of mined areas, MAPA’s of activities include,
among others (see Section 4):
• Survey and clearance of former battlefields.
• Mine and UXO awareness and education.
Data are available on the cost side of these components. The cost of UXO clearance
is discussed in Section 9 of this report. Benefits of these components have not yet been
systematically evaluated, however. Further data collection and analysis will be needed on
the benefits from battlefield clearance, in particular on the frequency of UXO accidents, and
on the impact of mine awareness campaigns on rates of accidents of different types.
Survey and marking of minefields and former battlefields are integral parts of
clearance; all areas will normally be surveyed and marked as preparation for clearance. It is
possible, however, that surveying and marking, or sealing off mined areas with fences, could
constitute an alternative to clearance in some cases, in combination with targeted mine
awareness campaigns. The socio-economic benefits and returns attributable to such activities
need to be assessed.
13.2

Clearance of Former Battlefields

Former battlefields, at which major clashes and combat occurred at different stages of
the war, normally contain numerous items of unexploded ordnance (UXO), as well as vast
amounts of fragments of different varieties of ammunition, weapons, and other equipment.
MAPA started clearance of former battlefields in 1994. As of the end of 1999, more
battlefield areas (240 km2) have been cleared on a cumulative basis than minefields (about
200 km2).
The main areas for battlefield clearance have been the central and eastern parts of the
country, especially Kabul which has been the top province every year since 1995 (see Table
13.1). Nangarhar (with Jalalabad) had large areas cleared in 1994. Wardak, situated in the
same part of the country, comes third. In addition, there has been UXO clearance activity in
the North, in the provinces of Baghlan and Kunduz, as well as in the West on the border with
Iran (in Herat and Farah). Activity seems to be picking up, with 11 provinces included in the
UXO clearance program in 2000.
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Table 13.1: Clearance of Former Battlefields in km2
Province
Kabul
Nangarhar
Wardak
Baghlan
Kunduz
Herat
Farah
Helmand
Samangan
Logar
Kandahar
Parwan
Paktika
Nimroz
Badghis
Faryab
Total

Total 2000-July 31 1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 1994
188.6
19.8
51.6
35.9
36.8
33.4
10.9
33.5
1.8
2.8
6.2
22.7
25.7
8.1
16.4
1.2
7.3
2.0
3.4
0.6
1.3
6.1
2.1
3.3
0.7
5.7
0.6
5.1
4.6
2.9
1.8
2.7
0.1
0.2
0.0
0.7
1.8
2.0
2.0
1.9
0.1
0.6
0.4
0.8
0.8
0.2
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.4
0.4
0.2
0.2
0.0
0.1
0.1
280.9
40.4
75.7
39.1
49.2
34.1
19.5
227

Former battlefields have not yet been included in socio-economic analysis of the
benefits from the mine action program. SEIS did not attempt to calculate the benefits from
clearance of these areas, and no socio-economic data are being gathered about former
battlefields in the current surveys for the MIS database. Moreover, these areas are not
classified in terms of type of potential use.
Former battlefields by definition do not contain mines (otherwise they would be
classified as minefields), whereas UXO and fragments may be found in large numbers.
These usually will not explode unless tampered with or forcibly removed. Former battlefields
are therefore not blocked from all use by UXO to the same extent as active mines can block
use of an area.
UXO are mainly a threat to people who pick them up to experiment with them or to
collect them for sale as scrap metal. It is sometimes argued that many of the mine victims
reported in Afghanistan are in reality UXO victims, but deficient data make estimation of the
percentage of UXO victims very difficult.
The cost of clearance is much lower for former battlefields than for minefields. The
amount of team-hours it takes to clear a given battlefield area is about 1/30 of what it takes to
clear a minefield of equal size. The estimates presented in Section 11 indicate a cost of 3.5
US cents per m2, or 35,000 US$ per km2. Almost all former battlefields are currently cleared
using manual techniques. The total cost of MAPA’s clearance of UXO from former
battlefields in 1999 is estimated at US$ 2.6 million.
On the basis of these costs and the benefit calculations presented in the previous
section, some rough estimates can be derived on the minimum level of socio-economic
benefits sufficient to justify clearance of UXO from one km2 of former battlefield area.
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Benefits in excess of this would imply a positive BCR. These estimates are presented in
Table 13.2.
Table 13.2: Clearance Cost of Former Battlefields
as Compared with Possible Benefit Components.
1000 US$
2

Cost of battlefield clearance per km .
Economic loss at one fatal casualty
Economic loss of an average mine victim
One victim each year over 15 years
10% of benefits for agriculture Case Study VI

35
12
9
69
36

The socio-economic loss associated with a risk of three fatal casualties in the
immediate future would correspond to the clearance costs of one km2 former battlefield, the
loss of four average mine/UXO victims likewise. An accident risk of one victim each year
over 15 years constitutes a loss of US$ 69,000, which is well above the clearance cost of US$
35,000 per km2 and would result in a high BCR.
Losses can also be considerable in cases where UXOs create problems for land use.
Net revenue from one year’s cultivation of a km2 of agricultural land, for example, exceeds
US$ 36,000 in all Case Studies except Case Study I (Table 6.13).
Further analysis will be needed to draw meaningful conclusions on the benefits from
UXO clearance activities. Assertions have recently been made that a larger share of the
number of victims could be related to UXO accidents rather than mines. This claim needs to
be carefully looked into, hopefully with more precise data on victims that can clearly
differentiate victims of mines and victims of UXO. In case it turns out that a large proportion
of victims should be reclassified as UXO victims, this could lead to recommendation that
MAPA’s clearance activities be directed away from costly mine clearance to the much less
expensive clearance of former battlefields.
13.3

The Role of Mine Awareness

Mine awareness is an integral and important part of all UN mine action programs
worldwide, including MAPA. It can be highly effective in reducing the risk of accidents
from active minefields and UXO and thereby would lower the numbers of victims. Mine
awareness is regularly considered as an integral part of mine clearance. The goal of mine
awareness is to train and inform civilians so that they can live and work safely in the vicinity
of active minefields. This is especially relevant for Afghanistan, since most likely a
considerable risk of encountering mine incidents will remain long after the identified highpriority mine-infested areas have been cleared.
A conclusion from the SEIS study and other observations is that a remarkably small
percentage of mine victims report that they have received mine awareness training, whereas
reportedly more than six million Afghans have attended mine awareness courses under
MAPA, 1.5 million in 1999 alone. It appears, however, that many people may have attended
more than one mine awareness course.
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It has also been argued that victims might be reluctant to admit to having ventured
into marked minefields or having tampered with UXO after receiving mine awareness
training. Nevertheless, there is good justification to look into what it would require in the
way of extra resources and skills to make mine awareness initiatives better targeted and more
effective.
A comprehensive analysis will be needed to assess the effects of mine awareness
activities in terms of reduced frequency of mine and UXO accidents. Mine awareness would
certainly be assigned a crucial role if surveying, marking, and sealing off mined areas is
adopted as a self-contained mine action strategy and an alternative to clearance where the
latter would be too difficult and costly.
The mine awareness component constitutes about 7% of total MAPA program costs,
or US$ 1.8 million of the US$ 26.3 million identified as funding requirements for 2000. The
cost-effectiveness of mine awareness as an alternative to clearance will depend in large part
on the amount and the time horizon for necessary future inputs of mine awareness activities
connected to such a strategy.
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14. Local Community Involvement
14.1

The Scope for Mobilization of Local Communities

The analysis conducted in this study aims to provide a basis for dealing with the mine
problem in Afghanistan from an integrated socio-economic perspective. Mine action takes
place in a local community context, however, and it is important to provide opportunities for
the local people to express their wishes and priorities on mine action in the context of
development programs in general. Local community involvement should be initiated at an
early stage of the mine action planning process.
Local people are in a position to provide valuable information needed for conducting
mine action operations, and in particular data on socio-economic issues. The aim of the
present study is to provide basic data and methods for analysis. This information can always
be improved by access to more site-specific information. Hence consultations with the local
community should form an important part of all fact-finding efforts.
Meaningful local participation rather than a top-down approach also will reduce the
potential for conflicts and contribute to greater the ownership of the mine action program on
the part of the local community. Local people should be given the opportunity to bring their
influence to bear by providing information and their viewpoint. Participation from otherwise
marginalized groups, such as women, land-less people, etc., may need to be particularly
encouraged.
14.2

Priorities on Areas to be Cleared

It is important to involve local communities in setting priorities on which areas
should be cleared first. This will enable the mine action program to productively make use
of local knowledge about the mined areas under consideration. It will also promote
community ownership and participation in activities as appropriate. Of particular importance
are the views of communities about which mined areas will be put back into productive use
immediately or very soon after mine clearance, since this is a critical determinant of the
socio-economic benefits and returns.
The local community may have viewpoints on various aspects of the program, and
also on technical questions like the clearance technique to be used, in particular since mine
action is a major employer in Afghanistan. People’s opinions for example on communitybased mine clearance could be important. Resource persons with special qualifications might
be identified locally, so that they can be assigned roles in the program.
Cooperation with the local community is of course important in other aspects of mine
clearance as well, in the interest of smooth operations and avoiding conflicts, thefts of
equipment, and damage to installations. A feeling of local ownership of the program is often
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a guarantee for good cooperation, and this attitude can be created and sustained through
active involvement by the local people right from the beginning.
14.3

Priorities on Mine Clearance Versus Assistance for Other Purposes

It would be desirable if the local community could also express its views on prioritysetting among the main sectors of development and support, such as health, education, water
supply, and other similar activities. Ideally, it should be possible to divert funds from mineaction to other sectors and vice-versa, when the local community expresses well-conceived
priorities in this regard.
At present this will not be possible to any significant extent, as most funds are firmly
tied to specific programs. Within the existing context, rational behaviour on the part of the
local community will be to seek every opportunity for external funding that emerges, and
leave the responsibility for overall planning to others.
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15.

Conclusions and Recommendations

This study has focused on the socio-economic benefits resulting from reductions in
mine accidents in terms of productivity and welfare and the economic benefits from making
cleared land available for productive use. The study has found that the socio-economic
returns to de-mining are high in general, fully justifying the allocation of substantial
resources by the international assistance community for this activity. These high returns are
particularly striking since not all benefits could be quantified and included in the
calculations, and moreover, conservative assumptions have been used in estimating the
benefits of de-mining in terms of reduced human losses.
The socio-economic loss related to a fatal casualty from a mine accident in
Afghanistan is conservatively estimated at less than US$ 12,000. The loss from a typical
mine victim is estimated at about US$ 9,000, when the proportion of different types of
casualties have been taken into account along with their respective degrees of disability.
Turning to the productive value of cleared land, the net value of agricultural output
exhibits wide variations, from about US$ 14,000 per km2 land annually to over US$ 300,000
in some cases. The corresponding benefits from mine clearance also vary accordingly.
The net annual output value from livestock rearing on one km2 of grazing area varies
roughly between US$ 1,200 and US$ 2,000. Both the level of benefits and the variation in
benefits are much less than those encountered in the agricultural sector.
The benefits from clearance of mined roads are considerable, over US$ 250,000
annually per 50 km (corresponding to one km2 mined road area). Benefits are high both for
clearance of urban roads and in the case of rural roads.
The highest returns as estimated in the case studies are for clearance of irrigation
systems in provinces with good conditions for agriculture. These clearance tasks can most
convincingly justify use of all kinds of de-mining techniques. Socio-economic returns also
are high for clearance of highly productive agricultural land and for roads.
One crucial factor is whether the land being cleared will be brought back to
productive use shortly after being de-mined. If this does not occur, socio-economic returns
are lowered and would turn negative if there is a significant delay.
Mine clearance on grazing land earns relatively low socio-economic returns.
Techniques other than dogs or community-based methods would be expected to earn
negative economic returns when applied to grazing areas. All regions show uniform small
returns for de-mining of grazing land.
The broader, difficult-to-quantify benefits from mine action would make clearance of
grazing lands more justifiable than is indicated from the case study findings. Nevertheless, it
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would be desirable to develop and try out less expensive clearance methods if MAPA is to
include substantial amounts of grazing areas in its program, and in particular if areas of lower
priority would be considered for extensive de-mining work in the future. Expansion of the
community-based approach could be a promising option in this regard.
Clearance using mine detection dog teams is overall the best technique, with the
highest BCRs under all conditions where use of dogs is feasible. No other technique
generates higher returns for any clearance task. Dogs consequently should be used wherever
this technique is applicable. Currently, dog teams are responsible for clearing about half of
the area being de-mined, but the binding constraint is not the type of land suitable for dog
clearance. With more dogs available, including larger training capacity for dogs, use of this
technique could be further expanded. Increased reliance on dogs will have some implications
for employment in de-mining, although dog teams also employ substantial numbers of people
for mine extraction. Further expansion in the use of dogs for mine detection would allow the
mine action program to clear a larger area of minefields with the same quantum of resources.
Mechanical clearance is costly to MAPA in relation to the socio-economic returns.
This technique should be applied only when no other options are feasible, and the socioeconomic justification will need to be demonstrated on a case-by-case basis.
The net benefits of the MAPA mine clearance program in 1999 are estimated at US$
31 million, resulting in a high BCR of 1.2. The corresponding internal rate of return is 28%.
These results are robust to sensitivity analysis. Excluding the welfare benefits of reduced
mine accidents, for example, results in a BCR of 0.8 and an IRR of 21%. If in addition, as a
second sensitivity check, the estimated number of mine accident victims per unit of mined
land area is reduced by half, the BCR further declines to 0.6 and the IRR to 19%, still quite
respectable and significantly above normal cut-off rates for decisions on public investment
projects or other programs. The largest portion of net socio-economic benefits is attributable
to clearance of agricultural land with dogs. Clearance of agricultural land and irrigation
systems with manual methods as well as clearance of roads with dogs also make strong
contributions to MAPA’s overall socio-economic benefits.
MAPA’s clearance costs for mined areas are estimated to US$ 0.77 per m2 in 1999,
while clearance of UXO from former battlefields costs an estimated US$ 0.04 per m2. The
area of minefields cleared per team hour of work under the MAPA program has decreased
over time. Generally it is far more time-consuming to clear minefields than former
battlefields. Agricultural land comes close to the average in area cleared per team hour, while
grazing areas are normally much less and residential areas far more time consuming to clear.
Based on the analysis conducted in this study and some further assumptions, it is
roughly estimated that clearing the remaining minefields identified by MAPA as highpriority would cost about $200 million, and that clearing other minefields would cost another
$250-300 million, depending on how many more previously undiscovered minefields are
found.
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The socio-economic analysis of mine action can be based on the tools developed in
this study. There will nevertheless be a need for continuous information collection, for
updating of Case Studies and databases, and for specific fact-finding for evaluation of
individual clearance tasks. The more generalized assumptions in the study could then be
supplemented or replaced by site-specific data.
For analytical purposes, the estimated BCRs in Table 12.1 can constitute a first
approach, while data from Annex 3 can be consulted when modifications of assumptions at
an aggregate level are required. In case a more tailored analysis is needed, details can be
extracted from the tables presented in Sections 5-10 on benefits and in Section 11 on costs. It
is also possible, to a certain extent, to make amendments directly in the numerous
spreadsheets which comprise the quantitative base on this study.
The local community should be actively involved in the mine action planning process
(as discussed in Section 14), with opportunities to express their wishes and priorities for mine
action in the context of local development programs in general.
A coordinated initiative to improve mine and UXO victims’ statistics in Afghanistan
is urgently needed. Questions about landmines in a broader household survey would form a
very useful component of such an initiative. The regular collection of statistics on mine and
UXO accidents needs to be better coordinated among the agencies involved. Mine and UXO
victims’ statistics are highly deficient at present. Some observers have suggested that large
numbers of victims could be associated with UXO accidents rather than mines. This might
imply that MAPA mine clearance activities should be shifted at least at the margin from
costly mine clearance to the much less expensive clearance of former battlefields. This issue
illustrates the importance of improving the information base on mine/UXO accidents and
victims.
Surveying, marking, and fencing off minefields, together with well-targeted mine
awareness campaigns, could be developed as an alternative approach to mine clearance,
especially for lower-priority areas where the economic returns to de-mining are doubtful.
Collapsed buildings – where mechanical de-mining would normally be used, manual demining would be dangerous, and dogs unusable – might be a good example.
Relatively large cost variations have been found between some of the mine clearance
agencies. There is a need to look further into the strengths, limitations, and cost structures of
the different clearance techniques and also the approaches and operational routines of the
individual agencies involved. In this connection, more detailed cost data from the mine
clearance agencies will be needed. For this and other purposes, it is recommended that all
mine clearance agencies introduce standard account systems and administrative routines that
make possible presentation of revised accounts on a timely basis.
MAPA is currently financed mainly through UNOCHA, but considerable funds are
also passed from donors directly to individual NGOs. The amount of funds passed on directly
is still only partially known to MAPA. It is recommended that MAPA start collecting this
information on a regular basis.
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More direct competition among mine clearance agencies could be a means of
improving the cost-efficiency of the mine action program. In order to achieve this, the rather
restricted access to the MAPA program will need to be opened up. Tasks now to a large
extent assigned on a command basis could be put out for some kind of competitive tender, to
encourage competition among technically well-qualified bidders.
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ANNEXES

Annex 1: Population of Afghanistan (1000) by Age Groups

75+
70-74
65-69
60-64
55-59

Age groups

50-54
45-49
40-44
35-39
30-34
25-29

41
48
78
88
124
138
176
196
237
258
302
326
375
401
456
490
553
591
666
707

Female
Male

803
838
945
1009
1075
1176
1238
1360
1448

20-24
15-19
10-14
5-9

1583
1748

0-4

Inhabitants, 1000

Source: Mohammad Ershad: Population of Afghanistan, IIPS, Bombay 1983
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Annex 2: Mine and UXO Clearance Costs – Detailed Explanation
Table 1: Cost Calculations for 1999
1999
1/
2/
3/
4/
5/
6/
7/
8/
9/
10/
11/
12/
13/
14/
15/
16/
17/
18/
19/

20/
21/
22/
1/
2/
3/
4/
5/
6/
7/
8/
9/
10/
11/
12/
13/
14/
15/
16/
17/
18/
19/
20/

21/
22/

Agency
Minefield km2
Battlefield km2
Team hours, 1000
- manual clearance
- mechanical/dog
US$ 1000
UNOCHA fund
UNOCHA overhead
In kind contribution
Mine Dog Sets
Other fund
Total cost US$ 1000
- non expendable equipment
+ depreciation
+ earlier years depreciation
Operations costs US$ 1000
Cost US$ per Team Hour
Monitoring, Training
Clearance Cost US$ per
Team Hour
Manual and mechanical
teams, dogs
Manual clearance cost US$
per Team Hour
Mechanical clearance cost
US$ per Team Hour

Mine and Former Battlefield Clearance
man-mec man man-mec man-mec
dogs
man-mec
man
Total
ATC
AREA
DAFA
OMAR
MDC
HALO* MCPA ex MCPA
6.63
0.38
2.95
3.48
16.88
1.65
0.28
31.97
23.81
0,06
17.24
0.28
41.11
32.22
3.48
14.73
9.84
19.84
17.40
1.23
97.51
28.08
3.48
14.73
9.84
15.48
1.23
4.14
19.84
1.92
5717.39
741.68
0.12

167.96
21.79
0.00

2581.35
334.86
0.06

6459.19
925.00

189.76
2.23

2916.26
74.33

185.00
185.00
5904.19
183.25
5.17

0.45
4.01
191.98
55.17
5.17

14.87
133.79
2990.59
203.03
5.17

1965.50
1965.50

1965.50
199.75
5,17

man-mec manual man-mec man-mec
ATC AREA
DAFA OMAR

188.42

60.34

208.20

204.92

3440.28
446.28
0.07
-904.78

1375.60
178.45
0.03

2981.86
33.00

1554.08
109.18

6.60
59.40
3014.86
151.96
5.17

21.84
196.52
1663.25
95.59

Survey
MCPA
31.99
23.79
983.49

HALO
5.01
54.15
204.45

13282.58 1 447.38
1723.06
187.76
0.03
904.78
1965.50
16066.64 2539.95
40.00
8.00
72.00
2579.95
502.57

dogs
man-mec
MDC HALO*

157.13

95.59

196
131

Techniques in use comprise manual, mechanical, and mine-detection dogs.
AREA is engaged in the community-based approach.
Data on minefields cleared using manual techniques.
Former battlefields cleared and surveyed is mainly from the MAPA Annual Report for 1999, but corrections have been made for HALO,
comprising only MAPA financed activities in Wardak province.
Information on team-hours is collected from the MAPA Minefield Database. Team hours are corresponding to the areas cleared.
Team hours are distributed on manual clearance.
Team hours are distributed on mechanical/dogs clearance.
Information about UNOCHA funds is taken directly from the Annual Report for 1999, page 27, AETF expenditure by agency.
UNOCHA overhead is added at the assessed rate of 13%.
The MAPA Annual Report for 1999 also gives information about in-kind contributions, which have been distributed over agencies on the basis of
work performance in team hours.
The cost of Mine Dog Sets working on survey tasks has been deducted from MDC and added to MCPA survey operations.
With respect to other funds provided directly by donors to agencies, there is information only from OMAR, which is funded entirely outside
UNOCHA/AETF for its mine clearance operations.
The total costs of agencies are corrected for the above-mentioned items. Total cost for MCPA in this row will be considered as total survey costs.
These costs will be divided by the amount of areas surveyed in km2 and distributed over agencies on the basis of areas cleared.
The cost item non expendable equipment in the MAPA Annual Report for 1999, page 27 AETF expenditure by agency, comprises investments and
should be treated like them. It has therefore been deducted from total costs.
Depreciation on basis of 20% per year (or depreciation over five years) is added, comprising capital equipment procured in 1999 only.
For non expendable equipment procured in earlier years, information is not yet available (this should be looked into). For the calculation of
depreciation it has been assumed, however, that ATC was renewing 50% of its capital in 1999 and the other agencies 10%.
Costs are corrected once more on the basis of 14-16.
Costs are calculated per team hour performed by the various agencies. Team hours presumably are the best available denominator for distribution
of costs, better than per m2 cleared, since performance varies greatly in terms of area cleared with both type of area, technique and over time.
Team hours are assumed to vary mainly with clearance technique.
META’s costs for monitoring, evaluation and training are added on a per team-hour basis.
Clearance costs per team hour are known for the different agencies and techniques. Cost data on clearance by MDC dogs are complete and are
used directly in the calculation of costs per km2 cleared of different types of land in table 11.8 of the report, with survey costs added. Data for
AREA’s community-based approach also are considered complete. A break-up of costs for the agencies using manual and mechanical techniques
will, however, need another approach, which will be explained later in this Annex.
The results these calculations are shown as manual clearance cost in US$ per team hour and and
Mechanical clearance cost US$ per team hour. These calculations have been based on data from ATC only.
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The estimated break-up of mine clearance costs as between manual and mechanical demining is based on available data from ATC only.
Table 2: Manual Teams
Team Personnel Cost
US$/year
Team hours worked year
Personnel cost US$/hour
Capital costs

Cost US$

Mine detectors (13)
Helmet (15)
Vizor (15)
Truck 4x6 Kamaz (1)
Ambulance 4x4 Land Cruiser
(1)
Pick up Twin Cabin 4x4
Toyota (1)
Apron (12)
Total

Life time
years

155520
1578
99
Capital
cost/hour

32500
3750
3750
31500
25000

2
2
0,5
5
5

10
1
5
4
3

10 %
10 %
10 %
10 %
10 %

Maintenance
US$/ hour
2,1
0,2
0,2
2,0
1,6

17000

5

2

10 %

1,1

9000
122500

5

1
27

10 %

0,6
7,8

Cost US$/Team hour
Team Personnel Cost
Capital cost
Maintenance cost
Team cost/Manual Team hour

Maintenance

US$/Team hour
99
27
8
133

Table 3: Mechanical Teams
Team Personnel Cost
US$/year
Hours worked
Personnel cost US$/hour
Team Equipment Cost
Mine detectors
(4 partic + 2 spare = 6)
Ambulance 4x4 Nissan Patrol (1)
Pick up 4x4 Nissan (1)
VHF Hand Sets (3)
Helmet (6)
Visor (6)
Apron (4)
Backhoe Machine
Total

Total cost
US$
15000

Life time
years
2

24000
18500
1800
1500
1500
3000
134000

5
5
2
2
0,5
5
5

Cost US$/Team hour
Team Personnel Cost
Capital cost
Maintenance cost
Team cost/Mechanical Team hour

4

69540
1508
46
Capital
Maintenance Maintenance
cost/hour
US$/hour
5,0
10 %
0,99
3,2
2,5
0,6
0,5
2,0
0,4
17,8
31,9
US$/Team hour
46
32
13
91

10 %
10 %
10 %
10 %
10 %
10 %
10 %

1,59
1,23
0,12
0,10
0,10
0,20
8,89
13,22

The ratio between costs for a manual team hour and a mechanical team hour derived
from these calculations is about 1.5. The total costs of ATC as given in Table 1 in this
Annex will be distributed between the two techniques on this basis. Information on ATC
team hours for manual and mechanical techniques is available from the MAPA Minefield
Database.
The average cost per team hour from Table 1 (row 20) of US$ 188 will on this basis
be split as follows:
Table 4: Manual and Mechanical Teams Costs in US$ per Team Hour
Clearance Cost
Manual Teams
Mechanical Teams

Total Cost
196
131

Accident Cost
4.5

Team Cost
133
91

Overhead
58
40

Overhead %
44
44

Total costs shown here are significantly higher than the team costs obtained from
ATC. Costs are distributed so that the overhead percentage will be identical. About 13% of
the overhead consists of the UNOCHA costs, and another 2-3% is META expenses. ATC
overhead could thus be 28-29%. De-mining accidents costs are added to ATC costs on top of
this at the rate of US$ 4.5 per team hour for manual teams. These are the basic data for the
calculations in Table 11.8, where survey costs are also included.
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Annex 3: Cost-Benefit Case Studies
Human
loss

Land
output

Animal Clearanc
loss
e cost Technique

Case Study

Provinces, regions

Land type

CB-Ratio

Case Study V

Kandahar, Zabul, Oruzgan

Irrigation

914

7584

279

Dogs

Case Study III

Logar, Wardak

Irrigation

914

3803

279

Dogs

15,9

Case Study IV

Nangarhar, Laghman, Kunar

Irrigation

914

3069

279

Dogs

13,3

Case Study V

Kandahar, Zabul, Oruzgan

Agriculture

610

2533

14

250

Dogs

11,6

Case Study IX

Kandahar, Laghman, Kabul

Roads

914

2207

14

306

Dogs

9,2

279

Dogs

8,9

14

306

Dogs

8,5

29,5

Case Study II

Parwan, Kabul, Kapisa, Bamyan

Irrigation

914

1854

Case Study X

Other provinces except Case IX

Roads

914

1983

Case Study VII

Helmand; Nimroz

Irrigation

914

1422

279

Dogs

7,4

Case Study V

Kandahar, Zabul, Oruzgan

Irrigation

914

7584

1041

Manual

7,2

Case Study VIII

Herat, Badghis, Farah

Irrigation

914

1356

279

Dogs

7,1

Case Study III

Logar, Wardak

Agriculture

610

1272

Case Study VI

Ghazni, Paktika, Paktia

Irrigation

914

1071

Case Study IV

Nangarhar, Laghman, Kunar

Agriculture

610

1027

Case Study II

Parwan, Kabul, Kapisa, Bamyan

Agriculture

610

622

Case Study V

Kandahar, Zabul, Oruzgan

Irrigation

914

7584

Case Study III

Logar, Wardak

Irrigation

914

3803

1041

Manual

3,5

Case Study VII

Helmand, Nimroz

Agriculture

610

478

14

250

Dogs

3,4

Case Study VIII

Herat, Badghis, Farah

Agriculture

610

457

14

250

Dogs

3,3

Case Study I

Northern Region all provinces

Irrigation

914

272

279

Dogs

3,3

Case Study VI

Ghazni, Paktika, Paktia

Agriculture

610

360

250

Dogs

2,9

Case Study IV

Nangarhar, Laghman, Kunar

Irrigation

914

3069

1041

Manual

2,8

Case Study I

Northern Region all provinces

Agriculture

610

107

250

Dogs

1,9

Case Study III

Logar, Wardak

Irrigation

914

3803

1744

Mechanical

1,7

Case Study II

Parwan, Kabul, Kapisa, Bamyan

Irrigation

914

1854

1041

Manual

1,7

Case Study V

Kandahar, Zabul, Oruzgan

Agriculture

610

2533

1336

Manual

1,4

Case Study IV

Nangarhar, Laghman, Kunar

Irrigation

914

3069

1744

Mechanical

1,3

Case Study VII

Helmand; Nimroz

Irrigation

914

1422

1041

Manual

1,2

Case Study VIII

Herat, Badghis, Farah

Irrigation

914

1356

Case Study IX

Kandahar, Laghman, Kabul

Roads

914

2207

Case Study VI

Ghazni, Paktika, Paktia

Irrigation

914

1071

Case Study X

Other provinces except Case IX

Roads

914

1983

Case Study XI

Kabul, Kandahar

Residential

914

5000

Case Study II

Parwan, Kabul, Kapisa, Bamyan

Irrigation

914

1854

Case Study V

Kandahar, Zabul, Oruzgan

Agriculture

610

2533

14
14

14

250

Dogs

6,6

279

Dogs

6,1

14

250

Dogs

5,6

14

250

Dogs

4,0

1744

Mechanical

3,9

14

14

14

1041

Manual

1,2

14

1599

Manual

1,0

1041

Manual

0,9

14

1599

Manual

0,8

3361

Manual

0,8

1744

Mechanical

0,6

1995

Mechanical

0,6

Case Study III

Logar, Wardak

Agriculture

610

1272

1336

Manual

0,4

Case Study VII

Helmand; Nimroz

Irrigation

914

1422

1744

Mechanical

0,3

Case Study VIII

Herat, Badghis, Farah

Irrigation

914

1356

1744

Mechanical

0,3

Case Study I

Northern Region all provinces

Grazing

305

16

14

262

Community

0,3

Case Study VIII

Herat, Badghis, Farah

Grazing

305

15

14

262

Community

0,3

Case Study V

Kandahar, Zabul, Oruzgan

Grazing

305

14

14

262

Community

0,3

Case Study VII

Helmand, Nimroz

Grazing

305

13

14

262

Community

0,3

Case Study II

Parwan, Kabul, Kapisa, Bamyan

Grazing

305

12

14

262

Community

0,3

Case Study III

Logar, Wardak

Grazing

305

11

14

262

Community

0,3

Case Study IV

Nangarhar, Laghman, Kunar

Grazing

305

11

14

262

Community

0,3

Case Study VI

Ghazni, Paktika, Paktia

Grazing

305

10

14

262

Community

0,3

6

Human
loss

Land
output

Animal Clearanc
loss
e cost Technique

Case Study

Provinces, regions

Land type

Case Study IV

Nangarhar, Laghman, Kunar

Agriculture

610

1027

14

1336

Manual

CB-Ratio
0,2

Case Study IX

Kandahar, Laghman, Kabul

Roads

914

2207

14

2563

Mechanical

0,2

Case Study I

Northern Region all provinces

Grazing

305

16

14

275

Dogs

0,2

Case Study VIII

Herat, Badghis, Farah

Grazing

305

15

14

275

Dogs

0,2

Case Study V

Kandahar, Zabul, Oruzgan

Grazing

305

14

14

275

Dogs

0,2

Case Study VII

Helmand, Nimroz

Grazing

305

13

14

275

Dogs

0,2

Case Study II

Parwan, Kabul, Kapisa, Bamyan

Grazing

305

12

14

275

Dogs

0,2

Case Study III

Logar, Wardak

Grazing

305

11

14

275

Dogs

0,2

Case Study IV

Nangarhar, Laghman, Kunar

Grazing

305

11

14

275

Dogs

0,2

Case Study VI

Ghazni, Paktika, Paktia

Grazing

305

10

14

275

Dogs

0,2

Case Study I

Northern Region all provinces

Irrigation

914

272

1041

Manual

0,1

Case Study VI

Ghazni, Paktika, Paktia

Irrigation

914

1071

Case Study X

Other provinces except Case IX

Roads

914

1983

Case Study XI

Kabul, Kandahar

Residential

914

5000

Case Study III

Logar, Wardak

Agriculture

610

1272

14

Case Study II

Parwan, Kabul, Kapisa, Bamyan

Agriculture

610

622

Case Study XII

Other provinces except Case XI

Residential

914

2000

Case Study IV

Nangarhar, Laghman, Kunar

Agriculture

610

Case Study VII

Helmand, Nimroz

Agriculture

Case Study VIII

Herat, Badghis, Farah

Agriculture

Case Study VI

Ghazni, Paktika, Paktia

Agriculture

Case Study I

Northern Region all provinces

Case Study II

Parwan, Kabul, Kapisa, Bamyan

Case Study VII
Case Study I

1744

Mechanical

0,1

2563

Mechanical

0,1

5749

Mechanical

0,0

1995

Mechanical

0,0

14

1336

Manual

-0,1

3361

Manual

-0,1

1027

14

1995

Mechanical

-0,2

610

478

14

1336

Manual

-0,2

610

457

14

1336

Manual

-0,2

610

360

14

1336

Manual

-0,3

Irrigation

914

272

1744

Mechanical

-0,3

Agriculture

610

622

14

1995

Mechanical

-0,4

Helmand, Nimroz

Agriculture

610

478

14

1995

Mechanical

-0,4

Northern Region all provinces

Agriculture

610

107

14

1336

Manual

-0,5

Case Study VIII

Herat, Badghis, Farah

Agriculture

610

457

14

1995

Mechanical

-0,5

Case Study XII

Other provinces except Case XI

Residential

914

2000

5749

Mechanical

-0,5

Case Study I

Northern Region all provinces

Grazing

305

16

14

673

Manual

-0,5

Case Study VIII

Herat, Badghis, Farah

Grazing

305

15

14

673

Manual

-0,5

Case Study V

Kandahar, Zabul, Oruzgan

Grazing

305

14

14

673

Manual

-0,5

Case Study VII

Helmand, Nimroz

Grazing

305

13

14

673

Manual

-0,5

Case Study VI

Ghazni, Paktika, Paktia

Agriculture

610

360

14

1995

Mechanical

-0,5

Case Study II

Parwan, Kabul, Kapisa, Bamyan

Grazing

305

12

14

673

Manual

-0,5

Case Study III

Logar, Wardak

Grazing

305

11

14

673

Manual

-0,5

Case Study IV

Nangarhar, Laghman, Kunar

Grazing

305

11

14

673

Manual

-0,5

Case Study VI

Ghazni, Paktika, Paktia

Grazing

305

10

14

673

Manual

-0,5

Case Study I

Northern Region all provinces

Agriculture

610

107

14

1995

Mechanical

-0,6
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